Population and Ethnic Groups

Singapore's total population was 6.11 million as at June 2025, made up of 3.66 million citizens, 0.54 million permanent residents, and 1.91 million non-residents (Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026). That three-way split is the single most important fact about Singaporean demography: nearly a third of the people in the country are neither citizens nor PRs but foreign workers, domestic workers, students, and dependants whose presence is regulated by pass policy rather than by immigration in the settlement sense (see work passes). Alongside this sits a second structural fact — a collapsed birth rate and rapid ageing among citizens — which together make immigration policy the central and most politically sensitive lever in Singaporean demography. Current headline figures are tracked in key statistics.

Residents, non-residents, and how they are counted

Singapore's statistics distinguish carefully between three groups, and conflating them produces most of the confusion in public discussion. Citizens hold Singaporean nationality. Permanent residents hold long-term residence status with rights to live and work indefinitely but not to vote, and male PRs and their sons are liable for National Service. Together citizens and PRs form the resident population, the base for most social statistics on income, housing, and education. Non-residents are everyone else present on a pass: work pass holders across all tiers, migrant domestic workers, students, and dependants. As at June 2025 the non-resident population grew 2.7% year on year to 1.91 million while the citizen population grew 0.7% and the PR population stayed essentially flat — the PR intake has been deliberately held near a stable annual quota for years (Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026). Roughly two-thirds of non-residents are the foreign workforce proper, with the remaining third mainly domestic workers, dependants, and students.

The CMIO framework

Singapore officially classifies its population into four racial categories — Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others — known by the acronym CMIO. The classification is recorded on identity documents, and it drives real policy: ethnic quotas in HDB blocks under the Ethnic Integration Policy, minority representation requirements in GRCs, mother-tongue assignment in schools (see languages and bilingual policy), and self-help groups organised by community. Among citizens in 2025, the composition was 75.5% Chinese, 15.1% Malay, 7.6% Indian, and 1.8% Eurasian and others (Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026); proportions for the wider resident population differ slightly because of the PR mix. CMIO is defended as the mechanism that guarantees minorities institutional presence and prevents majoritarian drift in a society with a clear ethnic majority. It is criticised for flattening enormous internal diversity — "Indian" spans Tamil, Malayalam, Punjabi, and many other communities; "Others" bundles Eurasians with everyone unclassifiable — and for entrenching race as an administrative category, though the option to register a double-barrelled race has softened this since 2010.

Fertility collapse and ageing

Singapore has one of the world's lowest fertility rates and it is still falling. The resident total fertility rate dropped below 1.0 for the first time in 2023 at 0.97, stayed there in 2024, and fell further to a record low of about 0.87 in 2025 — far under the 2.1 replacement level, and low even against East Asian peers. Ageing is correspondingly rapid: those aged 65 and above make up roughly 19% of the population as of 2025, and the number of citizens aged 80 and above rose about 60%, from 91,000 in 2015 to 145,000 in 2025 (Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026). The causes are the familiar high-income cluster — late marriage, cost of housing and childrearing, long working hours, and women's education and career participation — and successive pro-natalist packages of baby bonuses, tax reliefs, parental leave, and housing priority have not moved the trend. The consequences drive policy across the knowledge base: healthcare and long-term care financing (see healthcare financing), retirement adequacy (see cpf life), a shrinking working-age base, and the resulting reliance on immigration.

Immigration as the balancing lever

The National Population and Talent Division describes immigration as moderating the effects of ageing and low birth rates, while maintaining a measured pace and carefully controlled grants of PR and citizenship; in 2024, 35,264 people were granted PR and 22,766 were granted citizenship (Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026).

Because natural increase cannot sustain the workforce, Singapore maintains population size and economic capacity through controlled immigration: a steady annual intake of new citizens and PRs, plus a much larger, explicitly temporary foreign workforce regulated through pass tiers, quotas, and levies (see immigration and foreign workforce). This is the country's most contested domestic issue. The government's position is that immigration is a demographic necessity, calibrated to avoid overwhelming infrastructure and social cohesion, and that citizens receive clear priority in housing, education, and healthcare subsidies. Public concern focuses on competition for jobs and university places, crowding on transport and in housing, wage pressure at the lower end, and cultural change — sentiments that surfaced forcefully after the 2013 Population White Paper projected a possible 6.9 million population by 2030 and prompted rare street protests. Subsequent policy has tightened pass criteria repeatedly while keeping the overall model intact.