Population and Ethnic Groups

<h1>Population and Ethnic Groups</h1> <p>Singapore's total population was 6.11 million as at June 2025, made up of 3.66 million citizens, 0.54 million permanent residents, and 1.91 million non-residents (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>). That three-way split is the single most important fact about Singaporean demography: nearly a third of the people in the country are neither citizens nor PRs but foreign workers, domestic workers, students, and dependants whose presence is regulated by pass policy rather than by immigration in the settlement sense (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.daily-life.work-passes">work passes</a>). Alongside this sits a second structural fact — a collapsed birth rate and rapid ageing among citizens — which together make immigration policy the central and most politically sensitive lever in Singaporean demography. Current headline figures are tracked in <a href="/en/knowledge/dataset/sgkb.data.key-statistics">key statistics</a>.</p> <h2>Residents, non-residents, and how they are counted</h2> <p>Singapore's statistics distinguish carefully between three groups, and conflating them produces most of the confusion in public discussion. <strong>Citizens</strong> hold Singaporean nationality. <strong>Permanent residents</strong> hold long-term residence status with rights to live and work indefinitely but not to vote, and male PRs and their sons are liable for <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.defense-national-service.national-service-system">National Service</a>. Together citizens and PRs form the <strong>resident population</strong>, the base for most social statistics on income, housing, and education. <strong>Non-residents</strong> are everyone else present on a pass: work pass holders across all tiers, migrant domestic workers, students, and dependants. As at June 2025 the non-resident population grew 2.7% year on year to 1.91 million while the citizen population grew 0.7% and the PR population stayed essentially flat — the PR intake has been deliberately held near a stable annual quota for years (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Roughly two-thirds of non-residents are the foreign workforce proper, with the remaining third mainly domestic workers, dependants, and students.</p> <h2>The CMIO framework</h2> <p>Singapore officially classifies its population into four racial categories — <strong>Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others</strong> — known by the acronym CMIO. The classification is recorded on identity documents, and it drives real policy: ethnic quotas in <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.housing.hdb-system-overview">HDB blocks</a> under the Ethnic Integration Policy, minority representation requirements in <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.government-politics.elections-and-grc-system">GRCs</a>, mother-tongue assignment in schools (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.demographics-society.languages-and-bilingual-policy">languages and bilingual policy</a>), and self-help groups organised by community. Among citizens in 2025, the composition was 75.5% Chinese, 15.1% Malay, 7.6% Indian, and 1.8% Eurasian and others (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>); proportions for the wider resident population differ slightly because of the PR mix. CMIO is defended as the mechanism that guarantees minorities institutional presence and prevents majoritarian drift in a society with a clear ethnic majority. It is criticised for flattening enormous internal diversity — &quot;Indian&quot; spans Tamil, Malayalam, Punjabi, and many other communities; &quot;Others&quot; bundles Eurasians with everyone unclassifiable — and for entrenching race as an administrative category, though the option to register a double-barrelled race has softened this since 2010.</p> <h2>Fertility collapse and ageing</h2> <p>Singapore has one of the world's lowest fertility rates and it is still falling. The resident total fertility rate dropped below 1.0 for the first time in 2023 at 0.97, stayed there in 2024, and fell further to a record low of about 0.87 in 2025 — far under the 2.1 replacement level, and low even against East Asian peers. Ageing is correspondingly rapid: those aged 65 and above make up roughly 19% of the population as of 2025, and the number of citizens aged 80 and above rose about 60%, from 91,000 in 2015 to 145,000 in 2025 (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>). The causes are the familiar high-income cluster — late marriage, cost of housing and childrearing, long working hours, and women's education and career participation — and successive pro-natalist packages of baby bonuses, tax reliefs, parental leave, and housing priority have not moved the trend. The consequences drive policy across the knowledge base: healthcare and long-term care financing (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.healthcare.healthcare-financing">healthcare financing</a>), retirement adequacy (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.cpf-social-security.cpf-life">cpf life</a>), a shrinking working-age base, and the resulting reliance on immigration.</p> <h2>Immigration as the balancing lever</h2> <p>The National Population and Talent Division describes immigration as moderating the effects of ageing and low birth rates, while maintaining a measured pace and carefully controlled grants of PR and citizenship; in 2024, 35,264 people were granted PR and 22,766 were granted citizenship (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>).</p> <p>Because natural increase cannot sustain the workforce, Singapore maintains population size and economic capacity through controlled immigration: a steady annual intake of new citizens and PRs, plus a much larger, explicitly temporary foreign workforce regulated through pass tiers, quotas, and levies (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.demographics-society.immigration-and-foreign-workforce">immigration and foreign workforce</a>). This is the country's most contested domestic issue. The government's position is that immigration is a demographic necessity, calibrated to avoid overwhelming infrastructure and social cohesion, and that citizens receive clear priority in housing, education, and healthcare subsidies. Public concern focuses on competition for jobs and university places, crowding on transport and in housing, wage pressure at the lower end, and cultural change — sentiments that surfaced forcefully after the 2013 Population White Paper projected a possible 6.9 million population by 2030 and prompted rare street protests. Subsequent policy has tightened pass criteria repeatedly while keeping the overall model intact.</p>

简介

人口与族群

截至 2025 年六月,新加坡总人口为 6.11 百万,其中包括 3.66 百万公民、0.54 百万永久居民和 1.91 百万非居民(《2025 年人口简报》,2026 年八月查阅)。这三类人口划分是理解新加坡人口结构最重要的一点:国内近三分之一的人既非公民,也非永久居民,而是外籍劳工、家庭帮佣、学生和受养人;他们的居留受到准证政策管理,并非以定居为目的的移民(参见工作准证)。此外还有一个结构性事实——公民出生率低迷且人口迅速老龄化;两者共同使移民政策成为新加坡人口政策中最核心、政治敏感度最高的杠杆。最新主要数据见关键统计数据。

居民、非居民及其统计方式

新加坡的统计谨慎地区分三类人口,公众讨论中的大多数困惑都源于将其混为一谈。公民拥有新加坡国籍。永久居民拥有长期居留身份,享有无限期居住和工作的权利,但没有投票权;男性永久居民及其儿子须履行国民服役。公民与永久居民合称居民人口,是收入、住房和教育等大多数社会统计的基准。非居民则是持准证在新加坡的其他所有人:各类工作准证持有人、外籍家庭帮佣、学生和受养人。截至 2025 年六月,非居民人口同比增长 2.7%,达到 1.91 百万;公民人口增长 0.7%,永久居民人口基本持平——多年来,永久居民的接纳人数一直被有意控制在稳定的年度配额附近(《2025 年人口简报》,2026 年八月查阅)。非居民中约三分之二属于外籍劳动力,其余三分之一主要是家庭帮佣、受养人和学生。

CMIO 框架

新加坡官方将人口分为四个种族类别——华族、马来族、印度族和其他族群,简称 CMIO。这项分类会记录在身份证件上,并影响实际政策:建屋局组屋楼栋的种族配额遵循种族融合政策,集选区设有少数族群代表要求,学校会指定母语(参见语言与双语政策),以及按社群组织的自助团体。2025 年公民人口中,华族占 75.5%,马来族占 15.1%,印度族占 7.6%,欧亚裔及其他族群占 1.8%(《2025 年人口简报》,2026 年八月查阅);由于永久居民的族群构成不同,整体居民人口的比例略有差异。支持者认为,CMIO 是保障少数族群制度性参与、避免族群明显占多数的社会走向多数族群主导的机制。批评者则指出,这种分类抹平了庞大的内部多样性——“印度族”涵盖泰米尔族、马拉雅拉姆族、旁遮普族及许多其他社群;“其他族群”则把欧亚裔与其他所有无法归类者归在一起——并使种族固化为行政类别;不过,自 2010 年起,允许登记双重种族类别的选项已缓和了这一问题。

生育率骤降与人口老龄化

新加坡的生育率位居全球最低之列,而且仍在下降。居民总和生育率于 2023 年首次跌破 1.0,为 0.97;2024 年维持在这一水平,2025 年则进一步降至约 0.87 的历史新低,远低于 2.1 的人口更替水平,即使与东亚其他经济体相比也偏低。人口老龄化相应地快速发展:截至 2025 年,65 岁及以上人口约占总人口的 19%;80 岁及以上公民人数则在 2015 年至 2025 年间增长约 60%,从 91,000 人增至 145,000 人(《2025 年人口简报》,2026 年八月查阅)。原因与其他高收入社会相似——晚婚、住房和育儿成本、长工时,以及女性教育程度提高和职业参与度上升。历届政府推出的鼓励生育措施,包括育儿奖金、税务减免、育儿假和住房优先安排,都未能扭转趋势。这些后果影响知识库中的多个政策领域:医疗保健与长期护理融资(参见医疗保健融资)、退休保障(参见CPF LIFE)、劳动年龄人口缩减,以及由此产生的移民依赖。

移民作为平衡杠杆

国家人口与人才署称,移民可以缓和人口老龄化和低出生率的影响,同时维持适度步伐并谨慎控制永久居民和公民身份的授予;2024 年有 35,264 人获批永久居民身份,22,766 人获批公民身份(《2025 年人口简报》,2026 年八月查阅)。

由于自然增长无法维持劳动力规模,新加坡通过受控移民维持人口规模和经济能力:每年稳定接纳新公民和永久居民,同时依靠规模大得多、明确属于临时性质的外籍劳动力,并通过不同等级的准证、配额和税费进行管理(参见移民与外籍劳动力)。这是新加坡最具争议的国内议题。政府的立场是,移民对人口结构而言不可或缺;移民规模经过调控,以免基础设施和社会凝聚力承受过大压力,而且公民在住房、教育和医疗保健补贴方面享有明确优先权。公众关注的问题包括就业和大学学额竞争、交通和住房拥挤、低收入群体面临的工资压力,以及文化变化——这些情绪在 2013 年《人口白皮书》预测人口到 2030 年可能达到 6.9 百万后强烈浮现,并引发了罕见的街头抗议。此后,政策多次收紧准证条件,但整体模式仍然维持。