Singapore–Indonesia Relations

<h1>Singapore–Indonesia Relations</h1> <p>Singapore's relationship with Indonesia is shaped by geography: Indonesia is the archipelagic neighbour across the Singapore Strait, with the Riau Islands and Sumatra lying a short ferry ride from Singapore's southern coast. Unlike the land-border entanglement with Malaysia (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.singapore-malaysia-relations">singapore malaysia relations</a>), the Singapore–Indonesia tie is maritime but no less consequential — Indonesia's stability, economic growth, and environmental management directly affect Singapore's security, trade, and air quality. Formal diplomatic relations were established on 7 September 1967, when Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam and his Indonesian counterpart Adam Malik signed a joint communiqué, and both states were founding members of <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean">ASEAN</a> the previous month (<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-indonesia-hold-leaders-retreat-sign-mous-to-mark-50-years-of-diplomatic">ST, Sep 2017</a>). Today the relationship is among Singapore's warmest and most economically dense bilateral partnerships, anchored by annual Leaders' Retreats, six sectoral economic working groups, and flagship investment projects — while long-sensitive issues on military training, airspace, and law enforcement were packaged into <strong>Expanded Framework Agreements</strong> that entered into force together on 21 March 2024 (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>).</p> <h2>Historical background from Konfrontasi to partnership</h2> <p>The modern Singapore–Indonesia relationship sits atop a difficult early history. When Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, Indonesia under President Sukarno opposed the union through <strong>Konfrontasi</strong> — a campaign of political hostility, trade disruption, and armed infiltration that Indonesia framed as resistance to a British-backed neo-colonial project (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.history.merger-with-malaysia">merger with malaysia</a>; <a href="https://biblioasia.nlb.gov.sg/all-sections/vol-19-issue-4-jan-mar-2024-singapore-malaysia-indonesia-konfrontasi-confrontation/">BiblioAsia, accessed Aug 2026</a>). The conflict brought bomb attacks to Singapore, including the fatal MacDonald House bombing in March 1965, and strained the already fragile Malaysia–Singapore political union. Singapore's unexpected separation from Malaysia in August 1965 (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.history.separation-from-malaysia-1965">separation from malaysia 1965</a>) left a tiny, newly independent state facing a hostile regional environment and an imminent British military withdrawal. Konfrontasi ended after a peace agreement between Malaysia and Indonesia in 1966, but trust between Singapore and Indonesia had to be rebuilt from scratch. The pivot came quickly: Singapore and Indonesia were among the five founders of ASEAN on 8 August 1967, and formal bilateral diplomatic relations followed on 7 September 1967 (<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-indonesia-hold-leaders-retreat-sign-mous-to-mark-50-years-of-diplomatic">ST, Sep 2017</a>). The founding generation on both sides treated regional stability as a shared survival interest — a logic that still underpins Singapore's <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine">foreign policy doctrine</a> of investing in a peaceful neighbourhood. Periodic tensions have surfaced since — over sand exports, the haze, and military training rights — but the trajectory since the 1990s has been toward deeper economic integration and institutionalised high-level dialogue rather than confrontation.</p> <h2>Institutional framework and people-to-people ties</h2> <p>Singapore–Indonesia relations operate through layered institutions rather than a single treaty umbrella. The <strong>Leaders' Retreat</strong> — a summit between the two prime ministers or presidents — sets the political direction and has become the signature bilateral platform, typically producing MOUs across economics, defence, education, and the environment (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/indonesia/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Below that sits the <strong>Six Bilateral Economic Working Groups</strong> (6WG), co-chaired at ministerial level and covering the Batam, Bintan, and Karimun (BBK) region and other special economic zones; investment; manpower; transport; agribusiness; and tourism. The 15th Six Bilateral Economic Working Groups Ministerial Meeting in June 2025 reviewed progress across all six tracks and reaffirmed both countries as among each other's largest trading partners (<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/spore-and-indonesia-strengthen-economic-ties-amid-global-uncertainty">ST, Jun 2025</a>). Singapore maintains an embassy in Jakarta and consulates-general in Batam and Medan, reflecting the importance of engaging Indonesia's central government and key provinces — Riau Islands, North Sumatra, and Central Java among the most active — not only through Jakarta (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/indonesia/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). People-to-people ties include school partnerships, a <strong>Youth Mobility Programme</strong> facilitating cross-border internships for hundreds of tertiary students annually, and expanding air links to Indonesian cities beyond Jakarta (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). The 2017 <strong>RISING50</strong> commemoration — marking 50 years of diplomatic ties — symbolised how far the relationship had travelled from Konfrontasi, with joint RSAF–TNI-AU fly-pasts and a dense calendar of cultural and educational exchanges (<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-indonesia-hold-leaders-retreat-sign-mous-to-mark-50-years-of-diplomatic">ST, Sep 2017</a>). Leaders have looked ahead to the 60th anniversary in 2027 as a further milestone for deepening cooperation (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/transcript-of-remarks-by-minister-for-foreign-affairs-dr-vivian-balakrishnan-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-indonesian-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sugiono-in-jakarta--indonesia--12-may-2026/">MFA, May 2026</a>).</p> <h2>Expanded Framework Agreements: defence, airspace, and extradition</h2> <p>Three long-sensitive issues — military training, flight information region boundaries, and extradition — were negotiated as a package under the <strong>Expanded Framework Agreements</strong> signed at the Leaders' Retreat in Bintan in January 2022 and brought into force simultaneously on <strong>21 March 2024</strong>, after both countries completed domestic ratification and the International Civil Aviation Organization approved the airspace realignment (<a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/lee-hsien-loong-indonesia-joko-widodo-expanded-framework-agreements-relationship-4214701">CNA, Mar 2024</a>). The <strong>Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA)</strong> and its implementing arrangements clarify how the Singapore Armed Forces may train in designated Indonesian waters and airspace, respecting Indonesia's sovereignty and rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while preserving Singapore's training needs; the DCA runs for 25 years with extension by mutual consent (<a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/lee-hsien-loong-indonesia-joko-widodo-expanded-framework-agreements-relationship-4214701">CNA, Mar 2024</a>). The original DCA framework dates to agreements signed in 2007, and the 2024 entry into force unlocked expanded training cooperation that leaders reviewed at the 2025 Retreat (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). The <strong>FIR Agreement</strong> realigned the boundary between the Jakarta and Singapore Flight Information Regions to reflect Indonesia's archipelagic and territorial baselines — addressing Indonesia's longstanding desire to align FIR boundaries with sovereign territory — while delegating portions of the realigned Jakarta FIR to Singapore to continue providing air navigation services for <strong>25 years</strong>, ensuring safe and efficient traffic to Changi and nearby Indonesian airports (<a href="https://www.mot.gov.sg/news-resources/newsroom/parliamentary-ministerial-statement-by-minister-for-transport-mr-s-iswaran-on-the-agreement-on-the-realignment-of-the-boundary-between-the-jakarta-and-the-singapore-flight-information-regions/">MOT, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Indonesian civil–military air traffic personnel were subsequently stationed at Singapore's Air Traffic Control Centre as part of the implementation (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). The <strong>Treaty for the Extradition of Fugitives</strong> provides a formal law-enforcement framework; by June 2025 the first extradition case under the treaty was before Singapore's courts, with both legal agencies coordinating on due process (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). Singapore's Foreign Minister described the smooth implementation of all three agreements as evidence that complicated bilateral issues can be settled constructively when both sides commit to pragmatism (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/transcript-of-remarks-by-minister-for-foreign-affairs-dr-vivian-balakrishnan-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-indonesian-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sugiono-in-jakarta--indonesia--12-may-2026/">MFA, May 2026</a>). This FIR settlement is distinct from Singapore's separate airspace disputes with Malaysia over southern Johor management and the 2018–2019 Seletar ILS controversy (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.singapore-malaysia-relations">singapore malaysia relations</a>).</p> <h2>Economic cooperation, trade, and flagship projects</h2> <p>The economic relationship is the backbone of Singapore–Indonesia ties. Bilateral merchandise trade reached <strong>US$57.6 billion</strong> in 2024, with both countries among each other's largest trading partners (<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/spore-and-indonesia-strengthen-economic-ties-amid-global-uncertainty">ST, Jun 2025</a>). Singapore has been Indonesia's top source of foreign direct investment every year since <strong>2014</strong>; FDI flows from Singapore to Indonesia amounted to <strong>US$20.1 billion</strong> in 2024 (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>; <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/spore-and-indonesia-strengthen-economic-ties-amid-global-uncertainty">ST, Jun 2025</a>). Singaporean officials frame this capital flow as a vote of confidence in Indonesia's long-term growth, not merely portfolio diversification (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/transcript-of-remarks-by-minister-for-foreign-affairs-dr-vivian-balakrishnan-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-indonesian-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sugiono-in-jakarta--indonesia--12-may-2026/">MFA, May 2026</a>). Legal protection for investors is underpinned by a bilateral investment treaty that entered into force in March 2021, granting access to international arbitration (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/indonesia/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Flagship projects illustrate the pattern. The <strong>Kendal Industrial Park (KIP)</strong> in Central Java — a joint venture between Singapore's Sembcorp Development and Indonesia's Jababeka — was opened by leaders in 2016 and reached full capacity by its tenth anniversary in 2025, with a <strong>1,000-hectare expansion</strong> planned (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). In the BBK region near Singapore, the <strong>Nongsa Digital Park</strong> in Batam has become a tech and digital-services hub, while Sembcorp–Panbil joint ventures are developing new low-carbon industrial parks (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/indonesia/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Recent corporate milestones include the Ciputra SMG Curie Cancer Centre in Surabaya and the Nusantara Sembcorp Solar Energy Power Plant in Indonesia's new capital region (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). Monetary authorities on both sides have extended a <strong>bilateral financial arrangement</strong> — comprising a local-currency swap and USD repurchase agreement originally set at US$10 billion in 2018 — to support macroeconomic stability amid global uncertainty (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). An MOU on mutual recognition of halal certification between MUIS and Indonesia's halal agency, signed in August 2024, has facilitated food trade (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>).</p> <h2>Green economy and cross-border electricity</h2> <p>Green-economy cooperation has become a major growth axis in Singapore–Indonesia relations. At the June 2025 Leaders' Retreat, both sides exchanged MOUs on <strong>cross-border electricity trade (CBET)</strong>, cross-border carbon capture and storage, and a <strong>sustainable industrial zone</strong> in the BBK region (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). Leaders participated in a milestone ceremony for decarbonisation projects intended to realise those MOUs, including a large solar project in Morowali, Central Sulawesi, and further MOUs between Indonesian state entities and Singapore energy firms Keppel and Sembcorp (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/transcript-of-remarks-by-minister-for-foreign-affairs-dr-vivian-balakrishnan-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-indonesian-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sugiono-in-jakarta--indonesia--12-may-2026/">MFA, May 2026</a>). Singapore's Foreign Minister has characterised Indonesia as an energy superpower in waiting — with solar, geothermal, and hydroelectric potential — whose development complements Singapore's role as a regional hub for technology and infrastructure financing (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/transcript-of-remarks-by-minister-for-foreign-affairs-dr-vivian-balakrishnan-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-indonesian-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sugiono-in-jakarta--indonesia--12-may-2026/">MFA, May 2026</a>). Cross-border electricity interconnection is explicitly framed as a building block of the wider <strong>ASEAN Power Grid</strong>, which both governments want to advance alongside transport and digital connectivity (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). Food security is a parallel track: an MOU on food safety and agricultural technology was signed in 2025, alongside a Singapore-funded Young Farmers Development Programme to exchange best practices with aspiring Indonesian farmers (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). These initiatives sit within Indonesia's downstream industrial policy — Singaporean FDI has flowed heavily into basic metals, downstream processing, and services — and Singapore's own energy transition targets under the <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.environment-sustainability.green-plan-2030">Green Plan 2030</a>.</p> <h2>Environmental cooperation and transboundary haze</h2> <p>Environmental issues are both a cooperation area and a recurring source of diplomatic friction. Singapore's worst air-pollution episodes come from seasonal smoke drifting from land and peat fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan — the subject of the dedicated <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.environment-sustainability.haze">transboundary haze</a> article. Indonesia is the source country for most fires that affect Singapore's air quality; Indonesia ratified the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution only in 2014, more than a decade after signing it, and Singapore legislated its own extraterritorial <strong>Transboundary Haze Pollution Act</strong> in 2014 to pursue entities responsible for haze-causing fires abroad. Diplomatic tempers have risen during severe episodes — notably in June 2013, when Singapore's PSI hit record levels and leaders exchanged sharp public statements — but both governments also cooperate on fire prevention, monitoring, and the ASEAN haze framework. At the 2025 Leaders' Retreat, leaders exchanged MOUs on environmental cooperation alongside the green-economy package, and Singapore continues to fund technical capacity-building with Indonesian agencies on disaster management and environmental protection (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). The haze issue illustrates a structural feature of the bilateral relationship: Singapore cannot solve transboundary pollution alone, and Indonesia's vast land area and decentralised governance make central enforcement difficult — yet both sides recognise that unmanaged fires damage Indonesia's forests, harm Indonesian citizens, and poison the diplomatic atmosphere in Jakarta and Singapore alike. Cooperation on peat restoration, sustainable palm-oil supply chains, and the BBK sustainable industrial zone MOU are recent attempts to align economic development with fire-risk reduction.</p> <h2>Regional multilateral links and the SIJORI growth triangle</h2> <p>Singapore–Indonesia cooperation extends beyond the bilateral frame into wider regional architecture. Both are founding ASEAN members and coordinate closely on preserving ASEAN centrality, internal economic integration, and engagement with external partners — Singapore supported Indonesia's bid to accede to the CPTPP at the 2025 Retreat (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/singapore-indonesia-lr-2025-16-jun-2025/">MFA, Jun 2025</a>). Officials have also discussed reviving the <strong>SIJORI</strong> growth triangle — the Singapore–Johor–Riau Islands partnership that linked the three territories' complementary advantages in manufacturing, logistics, and services — alongside renewed trilateral cooperation with Malaysia (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/transcript-of-remarks-by-minister-for-foreign-affairs-dr-vivian-balakrishnan-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-indonesian-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sugiono-in-jakarta--indonesia--12-may-2026/">MFA, May 2026</a>). That trilateral frame connects directly to Singapore's land-border integration with Johor (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.singapore-malaysia-relations">singapore malaysia relations</a>) and the BBK investment corridor with Batam and Bintan. The overall posture Singapore pursues with Indonesia — candid leadership dialogue, dense economic interdependence, packaging sensitive sovereignty questions into durable legal frameworks, and refusing to let single disputes derail the wider relationship — mirrors the balance struck with Malaysia but operates across a maritime neighbourhood where Indonesia's scale, provincial diversity, and resource endowment make it simultaneously Singapore's largest regional partner and its most complex one.</p> <p>Singapore’s continuing engagement with the Riau Islands was illustrated by a Singapore Minister of State’s working visit to Batam on <strong>3–4 September 2026</strong>. The visit included meetings with Batam’s mayor and BP Batam chairman, engagements with business representatives and Batam Tourism Polytechnic, visits to industrial parks, and Singapore’s National Day Reception in Batam. MFA said both sides looked forward to strengthening business, tourism, human-capital, digital and renewable-energy links. These are stated cooperation directions, not evidence that a particular investment or project has already been approved or completed (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/visit-by-minister-of-state-in-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-the-ministry-of-home-affairs-zhulkarnain-abdul-rahim-to-batam--indonesia--3-to-4-september-2026-1/">MFA, 4 September 2026</a>).</p>

简介

新加坡—印度尼西亚关系

新加坡与印度尼西亚的关系受地理因素塑造:印度尼西亚是隔着新加坡海峡的群岛邻国,廖内群岛和苏门答腊岛距离新加坡南岸仅需短途渡轮即可抵达。与涉及陆地边界纠葛的新马关系(参见新加坡与马来西亚关系)不同,新印关系以海上往来为主,但同样举足轻重——印度尼西亚的稳定、经济增长和环境管理直接影响新加坡的安全、贸易和空气质量。正式外交关系于 1967 年九月 7 日建立,当时外交部长 S. Rajaratnam 与印度尼西亚外长 Adam Malik 签署联合公报;前一个月,两国还是东盟的创始成员(《海峡时报》,2017 年九月)。如今,两国关系是新加坡最友好、经济联系最密切的双边关系之一,以年度领导人峰会、六个行业经济工作组和旗舰投资项目为支柱;而长期敏感的军事训练、空域和执法问题则被纳入扩大框架协议,并于 2024 年三月 21 日一并生效(外交部,2025 年六月)。

从“对抗”到伙伴关系的历史背景

现代新加坡—印度尼西亚关系建立在一段艰难的早期历史之上。新加坡于 1963 年加入马来西亚联邦时,印度尼西亚总统苏加诺反对这一联合,并通过**“对抗”**运动展开政治敌对、贸易中断和武装渗透。印度尼西亚将此行动称为抵制英国支持的新殖民主义计划(参见与马来西亚合并;《书目亚洲》,查阅于 2026 年八月)。冲突期间,新加坡遭受炸弹袭击,包括 1965 年三月造成致命伤亡的麦唐纳大厦爆炸案,也使本已脆弱的马来西亚—新加坡政治联合更加紧张。新加坡于 1965 年八月意外脱离马来西亚(参见1965 年脱离马来西亚),成为一个刚独立的小国,面对敌对的区域环境和英国即将撤军。1966 年马来西亚与印度尼西亚签署和平协议后,“对抗”结束,但新加坡与印度尼西亚之间的信任必须从头重建。关系很快转向:新加坡和印度尼西亚于 1967 年八月 8 日成为东盟五个创始成员国中的两个,随后于 1967 年九月 7 日正式建立双边外交关系(《海峡时报》,2017 年九月)。两国建国一代都将区域稳定视为共同的生存利益——这一逻辑至今仍支撑着新加坡通过外交政策原则投资于和平周边环境的做法。此后双方偶有紧张关系——涉及沙土出口、烟霾和军事训练权等问题——但自 1990年代以来,关系总体走向更深入的经济融合和制度化高层对话,而非对抗。

制度框架与民间往来

新加坡—印度尼西亚关系通过多个层次的机构运作,而非由单一条约统领。领导人非正式峰会——两国总理或总统之间的峰会——确立政治方向,并已成为标志性的双边平台,通常会在经济、防务、教育和环境领域达成谅解备忘录(外交部,查阅于 2026 年八月)。其下设有六个双边经济工作组(6WG),由部长级官员共同主持,涵盖巴淡、民丹和卡里汶(BBK)地区及其他特别经济区、投资、人力资源、交通、农业综合企业和旅游业。2025 年六月举行的第 15次六个双边经济工作组部长级会议检视了六个工作领域的进展,并重申两国互为最大的贸易伙伴之一(《海峡时报》,2025 年六月)。新加坡在雅加达设有大使馆,在巴淡和棉兰设有总领事馆,反映出与印度尼西亚中央政府及主要省份保持往来的重要性——廖内群岛省、北苏门答腊省和中爪哇省都是往来最活跃的地区之一,而非只通过雅加达交往(外交部,查阅于 2026 年八月)。民间往来包括学校合作、为每年数百名大专学生提供跨境实习机会的青年流动计划,以及延伸至雅加达以外印度尼西亚城市的航线(外交部,2025 年六月)。2017 年举行的RISING50纪念活动庆祝两国建交 50 周年,象征着关系已从“对抗”走过漫长历程;活动包括新加坡空军与印度尼西亚空军联合飞行表演,以及密集的文化和教育交流日程(《海峡时报》,2017 年九月)。两国领导人展望 2027 年建交 60周年,视其为深化合作的又一里程碑(外交部,2026 年五月)。

扩大框架协议:防务、空域和引渡

军事训练、飞行情报区边界和引渡这三个长期敏感议题,通过扩大框架协议打包谈判。协议于 2022 年一月在民丹举行的领导人非正式峰会上签署,并于2024 年三月 21 日同时生效;当时两国均已完成国内批准程序,国际民用航空组织也已批准空域重新划设(新传媒,2024 年三月)。**《防务合作协定》(DCA)及其执行安排明确规定,新加坡武装部队可如何在指定的印度尼西亚水域和空域进行训练,同时尊重印度尼西亚的主权及其根据《联合国海洋法公约》享有的权利,并保障新加坡的训练需要;《防务合作协定》有效期为 25 年,经双方同意可延长(新传媒,2024 年三月)。原《防务合作协定》框架源自 2007 年签署的协议;2024 年协议生效后,双方得以扩大训练合作,领导人于 2025 年非正式峰会上检视了相关合作(外交部,2025 年六月)。飞行情报区(FIR)协议重新划定雅加达飞行情报区与新加坡飞行情报区的边界,以符合印度尼西亚的群岛和领土基线,回应印度尼西亚长期希望飞行情报区边界与主权领土相符的诉求;同时将重新划设后的雅加达飞行情报区部分区域的服务委托新加坡承担 25 年,以确保飞往樟宜机场和附近印度尼西亚机场的空中交通安全、高效(交通部,查阅于 2026 年八月)。作为执行工作的一部分,印度尼西亚民用和军用空中交通人员随后派驻新加坡空中交通管制中心(外交部,2025 年六月)。《引渡逃犯条约》**为执法合作提供正式框架;截至 2025 年六月,依据该条约提出的首宗引渡案件已进入新加坡法院审理,两国法律机构正就正当程序进行协调(外交部,2025 年六月)。新加坡外交部长表示,三项协议均得到顺利落实,证明只要双方致力于务实合作,就能建设性地解决复杂的双边问题(外交部,2026 年五月)。这一飞行情报区安排不同于新加坡与马来西亚在柔佛南部空域管理以及 2018—2019 年实里达仪表着陆系统争议上的另一起空域纠纷(参见新加坡与马来西亚关系)。

经济合作、贸易与旗舰项目

经济关系是新加坡—印度尼西亚关系的支柱。2024 年双边商品贸易额达到57.6 十亿美元,两国互为最大的贸易伙伴之一(《海峡时报》,2025 年六月)。自2014年以来,新加坡每年都是印度尼西亚最大的外国直接投资来源地;2024 年新加坡对印度尼西亚的外国直接投资流量达到20.1 十亿美元(外交部,2025 年六月;《海峡时报》,2025 年六月)。新加坡官员将这笔资金流视为对印度尼西亚长期增长的信心表现,而非单纯的投资组合多元化(外交部,2026 年五月)。一项于 2021 年三月生效、允许诉诸国际仲裁的双边投资协定,为投资者提供法律保障(外交部,查阅于 2026 年八月)。旗舰项目体现了这一模式。位于中爪哇的肯德尔工业园(KIP)由新加坡胜科发展公司与印度尼西亚 Jababeka 合资开发,领导人于 2016 年为园区揭幕;到 2025 年十周年时,园区已达到满负荷运营,并计划扩建1,000 公顷(外交部,2025 年六月)。在新加坡附近的 BBK 地区,巴淡岛的Nongsa Digital Park已发展为科技和数码服务枢纽;胜科与 Panbil 的合资企业则正在开发新的低碳工业园区(外交部,查阅于 2026 年八月)。近期企业里程碑包括泗水的 Ciputra SMG Curie 癌症中心,以及印度尼西亚新首都地区的 Nusantara Sembcorp 太阳能发电厂(外交部,2025 年六月)。两国货币当局延长了一项双边金融安排——该安排包括本币互换和美元回购协议,最初于 2018 年设定为 10 十亿美元——以在全球不确定性下支持宏观经济稳定(外交部,2025 年六月)。新加坡回教理事会(MUIS)与印度尼西亚清真机构于 2024 年八月签署清真认证互认谅解备忘录,促进了食品贸易(外交部,2025 年六月)。

绿色经济与跨境电力

绿色经济合作已成为新加坡—印度尼西亚关系的重要增长领域。在 2025 年六月的领导人非正式峰会上,双方就跨境电力贸易(CBET)、跨境碳捕集与封存,以及 BBK 地区的可持续工业区交换了谅解备忘录(外交部,2025 年六月)。领导人出席了脱碳项目里程碑仪式,推动落实这些谅解备忘录;项目包括在中苏拉威西省莫罗瓦利的大型太阳能项目,以及印度尼西亚国有机构与新加坡能源公司 Keppel 和 Sembcorp 进一步签署的谅解备忘录(外交部,2026 年五月)。新加坡外交部长将印度尼西亚形容为一座正在崛起的能源超级大国,拥有太阳能、地热能和水力发电潜力;其发展与新加坡作为区域技术和基础设施融资枢纽的角色相辅相成(外交部,2026 年五月)。跨境电力互联明确被视为更广泛的东盟电网的基石;两国政府希望与交通和数码互联互通一道推进电网建设(外交部,2025 年六月)。粮食安全是另一条合作轨道:双方于 2025 年签署食品安全和农业科技谅解备忘录,同时启动由新加坡资助的青年农民发展计划,与有志成为农民的印度尼西亚青年交流最佳实践(外交部,2025 年六月)。这些举措与印度尼西亚的下游产业政策相辅相成——新加坡的外国直接投资大量流向基础金属、下游加工和服务业——也与新加坡根据绿色计划 2030设定的能源转型目标相衔接。

环境合作与跨境烟霾

环境议题既是合作领域,也是外交摩擦反复出现的源头。新加坡最严重的空气污染事件来自苏门答腊和加里曼丹的土地及泥炭火灾所产生的季节性烟雾;专文请参阅跨境烟霾。影响新加坡空气质量的大多数火灾发生在印度尼西亚;印度尼西亚直到 2014 年才批准《东盟跨境烟霾污染协定》,比签署协定晚了十多年;新加坡则于 2014 年颁布本国的域外**《跨境烟霾污染法》**,以追究海外造成烟霾火灾的实体责任。在严重烟霾期间,外交气氛曾趋于紧张,尤其是 2013 年六月新加坡污染物标准指数(PSI)创纪录、两国领导人公开发表尖锐言论之时;但两国政府也在火灾预防、监测和东盟烟霾框架下开展合作。在 2025 年领导人非正式峰会上,双方在绿色经济合作方案之外,也交换了环境合作谅解备忘录;新加坡继续资助印度尼西亚相关机构开展灾害管理和环境保护方面的技术能力建设(外交部,2025 年六月)。烟霾问题体现了双边关系的一个结构性特点:新加坡无法独自解决跨境污染;印度尼西亚幅员辽阔、治理权力下放,使中央执法困难;然而双方都认识到,未受控制的火灾会破坏印度尼西亚森林、伤害印度尼西亚民众,并毒化雅加达和新加坡的外交气氛。泥炭地修复、可持续棕榈油供应链,以及 BBK 可持续工业区谅解备忘录,都是近期尝试将经济发展与降低火灾风险相结合的举措。

区域多边联系与 SIJORI 增长三角

新加坡与印度尼西亚的合作并不限于双边框架,还延伸到更广泛的区域架构。两国都是东盟创始成员,并在维护东盟中心地位、推动内部经济一体化及与外部伙伴往来方面密切协调——在 2025 年领导人非正式峰会上,新加坡支持印度尼西亚加入《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(CPTPP)(外交部,2025 年六月)。官员也讨论了重振SIJORI增长三角——即连接新加坡、柔佛和廖内群岛、利用三地在制造业、物流和服务业方面互补优势的伙伴关系——以及恢复与马来西亚的三方合作(外交部,2026 年五月)。这一三方框架直接连接新加坡与柔佛的陆地边界一体化(参见新加坡与马来西亚关系),以及以巴淡和民丹为核心的 BBK 投资走廊。新加坡与印度尼西亚交往的整体方针——坦诚的领导人对话、密切的经济相互依存、将敏感主权问题纳入持久法律框架,以及不让单一争端破坏整体关系——反映了新加坡与马来西亚关系中的平衡,但运作于一个海上周边环境之中;印度尼西亚的国土规模、省份多样性和资源禀赋,使其既是新加坡最大的区域伙伴,也是最复杂的伙伴。

新加坡持续与廖内群岛保持交往的一个例子,是新加坡一名政务部长于2026 年九月 3—4 日工作访问巴淡。访问包括会见巴淡市长和 BP Batam 主席、与商界代表及巴淡旅游理工学院交流、走访工业园区,以及在巴淡举办新加坡国庆招待会。外交部表示,双方期待加强商业、旅游、人力资本、数码和可再生能源联系。这些是已表明的合作方向,并不表明任何特定投资或项目已获批准或完成(外交部,2026 年九月 4 日)。