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Singapore\u2013China Relations\n\nSingapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is among the deepest and most economically consequential in its foreign policy. Formal diplomatic relations were established on **3 October 1990**, but ties had been building for years through trade offices, leader visits, and the shared reform-era dialogue between the founding Prime Minister and Deng Xiaoping. Today the partnership spans annual top-level summits, three flagship government-to-government projects on the Chinese mainland, a multi-stage free-trade agreement, and dense people-to-people flows \u2014 all conducted within Singapore's wider [foreign policy doctrine](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine) of refusing to choose between Beijing and Washington. Since **2013**, China has been Singapore's largest trading partner and Singapore has been China's largest foreign investor ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)).\n\n## Historical foundations and diplomatic recognition\n\nSingapore\u2013China relations predate formal diplomacy. The founding Prime Minister made his first official visit to China in **May 1976**; Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore in **November 1978**, and Singapore officials have long credited that trip with reinforcing China's reform direction ([NLB HistorySG, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)). A trade agreement was signed in **December 1979**, and both sides opened trade representative offices in **1981** \u2014 practical links that made the eventual embassy exchange largely a formality. Singapore nevertheless delayed full recognition longer than most of its neighbours. It was the last of the original five [ASEAN](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean) founders to normalise ties with Beijing, waiting until **Indonesia** resumed relations in **August 1990** so as not to be seen as a \"third China\" in a region where ethnic-Chinese minorities were politically sensitive ([NLB HistorySG, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)). Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signed the joint communiqu\u00e9 at the United Nations in New York on **3 October 1990**, and both countries upgraded trade offices to embassies ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/wjb\/zzjg_663340\/tyfls_665260\/tyfl_665264\/2631_665276\/202406\/t20240606_11405547.html)). The relationship deepened through the **China\u2013Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park** (launched **1994**), the first of three government-to-government showcases, and in **2015** leaders marked 25 years of ties with a joint statement characterising relations as an \"All-Round Cooperative Partnership Progressing with the Times\" ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). Singapore recognises the PRC as the sole government of China under its one-China policy; that formal position coexists with long-standing unofficial links to Taiwan discussed below.\n\n## Institutional framework and people-to-people ties\n\nSingapore\u2013China cooperation is steered through layered institutions rather than a single treaty umbrella. The **Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC)** \u2014 co-chaired at deputy-prime-minister or vice-premier level \u2014 is the apex annual forum, typically producing dozens of memoranda across trade, sustainability, education, and health. The **19th JCBC** in Tianjin in **December 2023** yielded **24** cooperation outcomes, the highest in recent years, including the latest free-trade upgrade and a mutual visa-exemption arrangement ([CNA, Dec 2023](https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/upgraded-singapore-china-free-trade-agreement-24-signed-annual-top-level-meeting-3972101)). Below JCBC sit sectoral councils with Chinese provinces and municipalities \u2014 Sichuan, Shandong, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shanghai among them \u2014 and working groups on the three government-to-government projects. Singapore maintains an embassy in Beijing and consulates-general in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Xiamen ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). Party-to-party exchanges between the People's Action Party and the Communist Party of China run alongside government diplomacy. People-to-people ties are substantial: since the mid-1990s, more than **50,000** Chinese officials have attended study visits and training programmes in Singapore ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). From **9 February 2024**, holders of ordinary passports from either country may enter the other visa-free for up to **30 days** for business, tourism, family visits, or private affairs \u2014 a reciprocal arrangement announced at JCBC 2023 and implemented through an exchange of diplomatic notes ([ICA, Jan 2024](https:\/\/www.ica.gov.sg\/news-and-publications\/newsroom\/media-release\/mutual-30-day-visa-exemption-arrangement-between-singapore-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china)).\n\n## Trade, investment, and the China\u2013Singapore Free Trade Agreement\n\nThe economic relationship is the partnership's backbone. Since **2013**, China has been Singapore's largest trading partner ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). In **2024**, Singapore's merchandise exports to mainland China totalled **S$94.4 billion** and imports **S$75.7 billion**, making China the top partner on both sides of the ledger in the MTI trade tables ([MTI, 2024](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/-\/media\/MTI\/Resources\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore\/2024\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore-2024\/FullReport_AES2024.pdf)). Investment flows run both ways. Singapore has been China's largest source of new foreign investment for **13 consecutive years** from 2013, and in **April 2022** became China's largest cumulative foreign investor, surpassing Japan ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/)). Chinese investment into Singapore is also significant: mainland China accounted for **S$18.2 billion** of Singapore's inward FDI flows in **2024** and **S$14.0 billion** in **2025** ([SingStat, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/data.gov.sg\/datasets\/d_c8a2af8867a601e1b34cf84d634486dc\/view)). Legal architecture for commerce rests on the **China\u2013Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA)**, China's first comprehensive bilateral FTA with an Asian country, which entered into force on **1 January 2009**. An upgrade protocol was signed in **November 2018**; a **Further Upgrade Protocol** signed in **December 2023** shifted services and investment toward a negative-list model and expanded digital-economy cooperation, entering into force on **31 December 2024** ([MTI, Dec 2023](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/china-and-singapore-sign-the-china-singapore-free-trade-agreement-further-upgrade-protocol-to-deepen-cooperation\/); [Enterprise Singapore, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.enterprisesg.gov.sg\/-\/media\/ESG\/files\/Non-Financial-Assistance\/For-Companies\/Free-Trade-Agreements\/CSFTA\/CSFTA_Protocol_2023)). Financial connectivity complements goods and services trade: a bilateral local-currency swap facility has been renewed at **RMB 300 billion \/ S$65 billion**, and Singapore hosts offshore RMB clearing and RQFII access for Chinese institutions ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/)).\n\n## Government-to-government projects and strategic connectivity\n\nThree flagship **government-to-government (G2G)** projects anchor Singapore's economic diplomacy with China, each reflecting a different phase of Chinese development. The **China\u2013Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP)**, agreed in **1994**, was the first and became a model for industrial zones and urban management in the reform era. The **Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City**, whose groundbreaking was in **2008**, was conceived as a showcase for environmentally sustainable urban planning. The **China\u2013Singapore (Chongqing) Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity (CCI)**, launched in **November 2015** during President Xi Jinping's state visit, differs from its predecessors: rather than a bounded township, it is a network project focused on financial services, aviation, transport and logistics, and information and communications technology, framed by both sides as a priority demonstration project under China's **Belt and Road Initiative** ([MTI, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)). The **CCI Southern Transport Corridor (CCI-STC)**, established in **2017**, links Chongqing by rail to Qinzhou on the Beibu Gulf and onward by sea to Singapore and beyond \u2014 described by Chinese leaders as connecting the overland Silk Road Economic Belt with the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road ([MTI, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)). Guangxi, Guizhou, and Gansu have joined the corridor platform. Beyond the three G2G projects, Singapore supports state-level and private-sector-led platforms including the China\u2013Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City, the Singapore\u2013Sichuan Hi-Tech Innovation Park, and the Singapore\u2013China (Shenzhen) Smart City Initiative ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)).\n\n## Balancing Beijing and Washington\n\nSingapore's China relationship sits inside a wider posture of refusing to choose between major powers \u2014 the central tension in its [foreign policy doctrine](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine). Singapore is neither a US treaty ally nor a Chinese security partner; it hosts US naval logistics facilities and buys American military technology while running G2G projects in Suzhou, Tianjin, and Chongqing and maintaining dense party-to-party and business links with Beijing. The Prime Minister has described the stance as \"pro-Singapore\" rather than pro-China or pro-America, warning that forcing countries to pick sides could destabilise the region ([ST, Sep 2024](https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan)). The Foreign Minister has said Singapore delivers the same message to both capitals, will remain open to businesses from both countries, and aims to be useful without being \"made use of\" ([ST, Sep 2024](https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan)). US\u2013China technology export controls, supply-chain restructuring, and tariff disputes have made this balancing act materially harder since the late 2010s. Singapore's leadership argues that full economic decoupling would damage both superpowers and the wider region, and that ASEAN centrality plus dense trade agreements (including the CPTPP and RCEP) offer partial insulation \u2014 but acknowledges that advancing relations with both powers simultaneously requires agility from government, business, and society. The China relationship is therefore not a separate track from US ties but one compartment of a single omni-directional strategy.\n\n## Taiwan, Hong Kong, and friction points\n\nSeveral issues test the partnership's limits. **Taiwan** is the most sensitive. Singapore recognised the Republic of China at independence in 1965 and switched recognition to the PRC in 1990, but it has maintained long-standing unofficial ties with Taipei, including military training arrangements dating from the 1970s that Beijing opposes as incompatible with the one-China principle. The **November 2016** detention in Hong Kong of nine Singapore Armed Forces **Terrex** infantry carrier vehicles returning from training in Taiwan \u2014 held for two months over shipping-permit irregularities \u2014 became a diplomatic flashpoint. Beijing lodged a protest and warned against military exchanges with Taiwan; Hong Kong released the vehicles in **January 2017** after investigation ([MINDEF, Nov 2016](https:\/\/www.mindef.gov.sg\/news-and-events\/latest-releases\/25nov16_nr2\/)). Singapore did not abandon Taiwan training but the incident illustrated how cross-strait politics can intrude on commercial logistics. **Hong Kong** matters as a financial hub and transit point for Singaporean business; Singapore has generally aligned with Beijing's \"one country, two systems\" framing in public statements while preserving its own legal and immigration systems. South China Sea sovereignty disputes are another friction vector: Singapore does not claim territory but advocates freedom of navigation and a rules-based order, positions that sometimes diverge from Beijing's. Domestically, Singapore's ethnic-Chinese majority shares cultural and linguistic ties with China, yet the government stresses a distinct Singaporean identity \u2014 part of why leaders resist being labelled pro-China despite deep economic integration. These tensions do not negate the partnership's depth, but they explain why Singapore\u2013China relations are often described as uniquely close yet permanently hedged.","summary":"Singapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China is one of its deepest bilateral ties: formal diplomatic relations since 1990, China as Singapore's largest trading partner since 2013, Singapore as China's largest foreign investor, three flagship government-to-government projects, and a layered free-trade agreement \u2014 all managed within Singapore's wider balancing act between Beijing and Washington.","title":"Singapore\u2013China Relations"},"zh":{"markdown":"# \u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u5173\u7cfb\n\n\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\uff08PRC\uff09\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u5176\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u4e2d\u6700\u6df1\u539a\u3001\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5f71\u54cd\u6700\u91cd\u5927\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u4e4b\u4e00\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u4e8e **1990\u5e74\u5341\u6708 3 \u65e5** \u5efa\u7acb\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u4f46\u591a\u5e74\u6765\u5df2\u901a\u8fc7\u8d38\u6613\u529e\u4e8b\u5904\u3001\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u4e92\u8bbf\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u5efa\u56fd\u603b\u7406\u4e0e\u9093\u5c0f\u5e73\u4e4b\u95f4\u56f4\u7ed5\u6539\u9769\u65f6\u671f\u7684\u5171\u540c\u5bf9\u8bdd\u9010\u6b65\u5efa\u7acb\u8054\u7cfb\u3002\u5982\u4eca\uff0c\u53cc\u65b9\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u6db5\u76d6\u5e74\u5ea6\u9ad8\u5c42\u5cf0\u4f1a\u3001\u4e2d\u56fd\u5927\u9646\u4e09\u4e2a\u65d7\u8230\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u3001\u591a\u9636\u6bb5\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\u4ee5\u53ca\u5bc6\u5207\u7684\u6c11\u95f4\u5f80\u6765\u2014\u2014\u6240\u6709\u8fd9\u4e9b\u90fd\u5904\u4e8e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u66f4\u5e7f\u6cdb\u7684[\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u539f\u5219](\/zh\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine)\u4e4b\u4e2d\uff0c\u5373\u4e0d\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u9009\u8fb9\u7ad9\u3002\u81ea **2013 \u5e74** \u8d77\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e00\u76f4\u662f\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff0c\u800c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e00\u76f4\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u6700\u5927\u7684\u5916\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002\n\n## \u5386\u53f2\u57fa\u7840\u4e0e\u5916\u4ea4\u627f\u8ba4\n\n\u65b0\u4e2d\u5173\u7cfb\u65e9\u4e8e\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\u3002\u5efa\u56fd\u603b\u7406\u4e8e **1976 \u5e74\u4e94\u6708** \u9996\u6b21\u6b63\u5f0f\u8bbf\u95ee\u4e2d\u56fd\uff1b\u9093\u5c0f\u5e73\u4e8e **1978 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708** \u8bbf\u95ee\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5b98\u5458\u957f\u671f\u4ee5\u6765\u5c06\u8fd9\u6b21\u8bbf\u95ee\u89c6\u4e3a\u5de9\u56fa\u4e2d\u56fd\u6539\u9769\u65b9\u5411\u7684\u56e0\u7d20\uff08[NLB HistorySG\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)\uff09\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u4e8e **1979 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708** \u7b7e\u7f72\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u5e76\u4e8e **1981 \u5e74** \u4e92\u8bbe\u8d38\u6613\u4ee3\u8868\u5904\u2014\u2014\u8fd9\u4e9b\u52a1\u5b9e\u8054\u7cfb\u4f7f\u540e\u6765\u4e92\u8bbe\u5927\u4f7f\u9986\u51e0\u4e4e\u53ea\u662f\u624b\u7eed\u95ee\u9898\u3002\u7136\u800c\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6b63\u5f0f\u627f\u8ba4\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u65f6\u95f4\u4ecd\u6bd4\u5927\u591a\u6570\u90bb\u56fd\u66f4\u665a\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u662f\u6700\u521d\u4e94\u4e2a[\u4e1c\u76df](\/zh\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean)\u521b\u59cb\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u4e2d\u6700\u540e\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e0e\u5317\u4eac\u5b9e\u73b0\u5173\u7cfb\u6b63\u5e38\u5316\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\uff1b\u4e3a\u907f\u514d\u5728\u534e\u88d4\u5c11\u6570\u65cf\u7fa4\u653f\u6cbb\u654f\u611f\u7684\u5730\u533a\u88ab\u89c6\u4e3a\u201c\u7b2c\u4e09\u4e2a\u4e2d\u56fd\u201d\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u7b49\u5230**\u5370\u5ea6\u5c3c\u897f\u4e9a**\u4e8e **1990 \u5e74\u516b\u6708** \u6062\u590d\u5173\u7cfb\u540e\u624d\u91c7\u53d6\u884c\u52a8\uff08[NLB HistorySG\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)\uff09\u3002\u5916\u4ea4\u90e8\u957f\u9ec4\u6839\u6210\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u5916\u4ea4\u90e8\u957f\u94b1\u5176\u741b\u4e8e **1990 \u5e74\u5341\u6708 3 \u65e5** \u5728\u7ebd\u7ea6\u8054\u5408\u56fd\u7b7e\u7f72\u8054\u5408\u516c\u62a5\uff0c\u4e24\u56fd\u5e76\u5c06\u8d38\u6613\u529e\u4e8b\u5904\u5347\u683c\u4e3a\u5927\u4f7f\u9986\uff08[PRC MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/wjb\/zzjg_663340\/tyfls_665260\/tyfl_665264\/2631_665276\/202406\/t20240606_11405547.html)\uff09\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u5173\u7cfb\u901a\u8fc7**\u4e2d\u65b0\u82cf\u5dde\u5de5\u4e1a\u56ed\u533a**\uff08\u4e8e **1994 \u5e74** \u542f\u52a8\uff09\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u6df1\u5316\uff1b\u8fd9\u662f\u4e09\u4e2a\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u793a\u8303\u9879\u76ee\u4e2d\u7684\u7b2c\u4e00\u4e2a\u3002**2015 \u5e74**\uff0c\u4e24\u56fd\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u5171\u540c\u7eaa\u5ff5\u5efa\u4ea4 25 \u5468\u5e74\uff0c\u5e76\u53d1\u8868\u8054\u5408\u58f0\u660e\uff0c\u5c06\u5173\u7cfb\u5b9a\u6027\u4e3a\u201c\u4e0e\u65f6\u4ff1\u8fdb\u7684\u5168\u65b9\u4f4d\u5408\u4f5c\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u201d\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4f9d\u636e\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e2d\u56fd\u653f\u7b56\u627f\u8ba4\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u552f\u4e00\u5408\u6cd5\u653f\u5e9c\uff1b\u8fd9\u4e00\u6b63\u5f0f\u7acb\u573a\u4e0e\u4e0b\u6587\u6240\u8ff0\u3001\u957f\u671f\u7ef4\u6301\u7684\u5bf9\u53f0\u975e\u5b98\u65b9\u5173\u7cfb\u5e76\u5b58\u3002\n\n## \u5236\u5ea6\u6846\u67b6\u4e0e\u6c11\u95f4\u5f80\u6765\n\n\u65b0\u4e2d\u5408\u4f5c\u901a\u8fc7\u591a\u5c42\u6b21\u673a\u6784\u800c\u975e\u5355\u4e00\u6761\u7ea6\u6846\u67b6\u8fdb\u884c\u7edf\u7b79\u3002**\u53cc\u8fb9\u5408\u4f5c\u8054\u5408\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\uff08JCBC\uff09**\u7531\u526f\u603b\u7406\u6216\u526f\u603b\u7406\u7ea7\u5b98\u5458\u5171\u540c\u4e3b\u6301\uff0c\u662f\u5e74\u5ea6\u6700\u9ad8\u5c42\u7ea7\u8bba\u575b\uff0c\u901a\u5e38\u5c31\u8d38\u6613\u3001\u53ef\u6301\u7eed\u53d1\u5c55\u3001\u6559\u80b2\u548c\u536b\u751f\u7b49\u9886\u57df\u8fbe\u6210\u6570\u5341\u9879\u8c05\u89e3\u5907\u5fd8\u5f55\u3002**\u7b2c 19\u5c4a JCBC** \u4e8e **2023 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708** \u5728\u5929\u6d25\u4e3e\u884c\uff0c\u53d6\u5f97 **24** \u9879\u5408\u4f5c\u6210\u679c\uff0c\u4e3a\u8fd1\u5e74\u6765\u6700\u591a\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u5305\u62ec\u6700\u65b0\u7684\u81ea\u8d38\u534f\u5b9a\u5347\u7ea7\u548c\u4e92\u514d\u7b7e\u8bc1\u5b89\u6392\uff08[CNA\uff0c2023 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708](https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/upgraded-singapore-china-free-trade-agreement-24-signed-annual-top-level-meeting-3972101)\uff09\u3002JCBC \u4ee5\u4e0b\u8bbe\u6709\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u7701\u5e02\u5408\u4f5c\u7684\u884c\u4e1a\u7406\u4e8b\u4f1a\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u56db\u5ddd\u3001\u5c71\u4e1c\u3001\u8fbd\u5b81\u3001\u6d59\u6c5f\u3001\u5929\u6d25\u3001\u5e7f\u4e1c\u3001\u6c5f\u82cf\u548c\u4e0a\u6d77\uff1b\u4e09\u4e2a\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u4e5f\u8bbe\u6709\u5de5\u4f5c\u7ec4\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u8bbe\u6709\u5927\u4f7f\u9986\uff0c\u5e76\u5728\u4e0a\u6d77\u3001\u5e7f\u5dde\u3001\u6210\u90fd\u548c\u53a6\u95e8\u8bbe\u6709\u603b\u9886\u4e8b\u9986\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 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\u5929**\uff0c\u7528\u4e8e\u5546\u52a1\u3001\u65c5\u6e38\u3001\u63a2\u4eb2\u6216\u79c1\u4eba\u4e8b\u52a1\u2014\u2014\u8be5\u4e92\u60e0\u5b89\u6392\u5728 2023 \u5e74 JCBC \u4f1a\u8bae\u4e0a\u5ba3\u5e03\uff0c\u5e76\u901a\u8fc7\u4ea4\u6362\u5916\u4ea4\u7167\u4f1a\u5b9e\u65bd\uff08[ICA\uff0c2024 \u5e74\u4e00\u6708](https:\/\/www.ica.gov.sg\/news-and-publications\/newsroom\/media-release\/mutual-30-day-visa-exemption-arrangement-between-singapore-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china)\uff09\u3002\n\n## \u8d38\u6613\u3001\u6295\u8d44\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u2014\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\n\n\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u53cc\u65b9\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u7684\u652f\u67f1\u3002\u81ea **2013 \u5e74** \u8d77\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e00\u76f4\u662f\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002**2024 \u5e74**\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5bf9\u4e2d\u56fd\u5927\u9646\u7684\u5546\u54c1\u51fa\u53e3\u603b\u989d\u4e3a **94.4 \u5341\u4ebf\u65b0\u5143**\uff0c\u8fdb\u53e3\u989d\u4e3a **75.7 \u5341\u4ebf\u65b0\u5143**\uff1b\u6839\u636e\u8d38\u5de5\u90e8\uff08MTI\uff09\u8d38\u6613\u6570\u636e\u8868\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5728\u8fdb\u51fa\u53e3\u4e24\u65b9\u9762\u90fd\u662f\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff08[MTI\uff0c2024 \u5e74](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/-\/media\/MTI\/Resources\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore\/2024\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore-2024\/FullReport_AES2024.pdf)\uff09\u3002\u6295\u8d44\u5f80\u6765\u5219\u662f\u53cc\u5411\u7684\u3002\u81ea 2013 \u5e74\u8d77\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u8fde\u7eed **13 \u5e74** \u6210\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd\u65b0\u589e\u5916\u8d44\u7684\u6700\u5927\u6765\u6e90\u5730\uff0c\u5e76\u4e8e **2022 \u5e74\u56db\u6708** \u8d85\u8d8a\u65e5\u672c\uff0c\u6210\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd\u7d2f\u8ba1\u6700\u5927\u5916\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff08[PRC MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/)\uff09\u3002\u4e2d\u56fd\u5bf9\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u4e5f\u5341\u5206\u53ef\u89c2\uff1a\u4e2d\u56fd\u5927\u9646\u5728 **2024 \u5e74** \u548c **2025 \u5e74** \u5206\u522b\u5360\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6d41\u5165\u5916\u56fd\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\uff08FDI\uff09 **18.2 \u5341\u4ebf\u65b0\u5143** \u548c **14.0 \u5341\u4ebf\u65b0\u5143**\uff08[SingStat\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/data.gov.sg\/datasets\/d_c8a2af8867a601e1b34cf84d634486dc\/view)\uff09\u3002\u8d38\u6613\u7684\u6cd5\u5f8b\u67b6\u6784\u4ee5**\u4e2d\u56fd\u2014\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\uff08CSFTA\uff09**\u4e3a\u57fa\u7840\u3002\u8fd9\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e0e\u4e9a\u6d32\u56fd\u5bb6\u7b7e\u7f72\u7684\u9996\u4e2a\u5168\u9762\u53cc\u8fb9\u81ea\u8d38\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u4e8e **2009 \u5e74\u4e00\u6708 1 \u65e5** \u751f\u6548\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u4e8e **2018 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708** \u7b7e\u7f72\u5347\u7ea7\u8bae\u5b9a\u4e66\uff1b\u4e8e **2023 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708** \u7b7e\u7f72\u7684**\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u5347\u7ea7\u8bae\u5b9a\u4e66**\u5c06\u670d\u52a1\u548c\u6295\u8d44\u8f6c\u5411\u8d1f\u9762\u6e05\u5355\u6a21\u5f0f\uff0c\u5e76\u6269\u5927\u6570\u5b57\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5408\u4f5c\uff0c\u4e8e **2024 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708 31 \u65e5** \u751f\u6548\uff08[MTI\uff0c2023 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/china-and-singapore-sign-the-china-singapore-free-trade-agreement-further-upgrade-protocol-to-deepen-cooperation\/)\uff1b[Enterprise Singapore\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.enterprisesg.gov.sg\/-\/media\/ESG\/files\/Non-Financial-Assistance\/For-Companies\/Free-Trade-Agreements\/CSFTA\/CSFTA_Protocol_2023)\uff09\u3002\u91d1\u878d\u4e92\u8054\u4e92\u901a\u4e3a\u5546\u54c1\u548c\u670d\u52a1\u8d38\u6613\u63d0\u4f9b\u8865\u5145\uff1a\u53cc\u65b9\u5df2\u7eed\u7b7e\u53cc\u8fb9\u672c\u5e01\u4e92\u6362\u5b89\u6392\uff0c\u989d\u5ea6\u4e3a **300 \u5341\u4ebf\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01 \/ 65 \u5341\u4ebf\u65b0\u5143**\uff1b\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e5f\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd\u673a\u6784\u63d0\u4f9b\u79bb\u5cb8\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01\u6e05\u7b97\u548c\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01\u5408\u683c\u5883\u5916\u673a\u6784\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff08RQFII\uff09\u6e20\u9053\uff08[PRC MFA\uff0c2026 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\u5960\u57fa\uff0c\u65e8\u5728\u5c55\u793a\u73af\u5883\u53ef\u6301\u7eed\u7684\u57ce\u5e02\u89c4\u5212\u3002**\u4e2d\u65b0\uff08\u91cd\u5e86\uff09\u4e92\u8054\u4e92\u901a\u6218\u7565\u6027\u793a\u8303\u9879\u76ee\uff08CCI\uff09**\u4e8e **2015 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708** \u4e60\u8fd1\u5e73\u4e3b\u5e2d\u56fd\u4e8b\u8bbf\u95ee\u671f\u95f4\u542f\u52a8\uff0c\u4e0e\u524d\u4e24\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u4e0d\u540c\uff1a\u5b83\u5e76\u975e\u8fb9\u754c\u660e\u786e\u7684\u57ce\u9547\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u805a\u7126\u91d1\u878d\u670d\u52a1\u3001\u822a\u7a7a\u3001\u4ea4\u901a\u7269\u6d41\u4ee5\u53ca\u4fe1\u606f\u901a\u4fe1\u6280\u672f\u7684\u7f51\u7edc\u578b\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u53cc\u65b9\u5c06\u5176\u5b9a\u4f4d\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd**\u201c\u4e00\u5e26\u4e00\u8def\u201d\u5021\u8bae**\u4e0b\u7684\u4f18\u5148\u793a\u8303\u9879\u76ee\uff08[MTI\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)\uff09\u3002**CCI \u5357\u5411\u8fd0\u8f93\u901a\u9053\uff08CCI-STC\uff09**\u4e8e **2017 \u5e74** \u5efa\u7acb\uff0c\u901a\u8fc7\u94c1\u8def\u5c06\u91cd\u5e86\u8fde\u63a5\u81f3\u5317\u90e8\u6e7e\u7684\u94a6\u5dde\uff0c\u518d\u7ecf\u6d77\u8def\u901a\u5f80\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u53ca\u5176\u4ed6\u5730\u533a\u2014\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u79f0\u4e4b\u4e3a\u8fde\u63a5\u9646\u4e0a\u4e1d\u7ef8\u4e4b\u8def\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5e26\u4e0e 21\u4e16\u7eaa\u6d77\u4e0a\u4e1d\u7ef8\u4e4b\u8def\u7684\u901a\u9053\uff08[MTI\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)\uff09\u3002\u5e7f\u897f\u3001\u8d35\u5dde\u548c\u7518\u8083\u5df2\u52a0\u5165\u8fd9\u4e00\u901a\u9053\u5408\u4f5c\u5e73\u53f0\u3002\u9664\u4e09\u4e2a G2G \u9879\u76ee\u5916\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u8fd8\u652f\u6301\u7531\u5dde\u7ea7\u548c\u79c1\u8425\u90e8\u95e8\u4e3b\u5bfc\u7684\u5e73\u53f0\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u4e2d\u65b0\u5e7f\u5dde\u77e5\u8bc6\u57ce\u3001\u65b0\u5ddd\u521b\u65b0\u79d1\u6280\u56ed\u4ee5\u53ca\u4e2d\u65b0\uff08\u6df1\u5733\uff09\u667a\u6167\u57ce\u5e02\u5021\u8bae\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002\n\n## \u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u4fdd\u6301\u5e73\u8861\n\n\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u5904\u4e8e\u4e0d\u5728\u5927\u56fd\u4e4b\u95f4\u9009\u8fb9\u7ad9\u7684\u6574\u4f53\u7acb\u573a\u4e4b\u4e2d\uff0c\u8fd9\u662f\u5176[\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u539f\u5219](\/zh\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine)\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u5f20\u529b\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u65e2\u4e0d\u662f\u7f8e\u56fd\u6761\u7ea6\u76df\u53cb\uff0c\u4e5f\u4e0d\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b89\u5168\u4f19\u4f34\uff1b\u5b83\u4e3a\u7f8e\u56fd\u6d77\u519b\u63d0\u4f9b\u540e\u52e4\u8bbe\u65bd\u5e76\u91c7\u8d2d\u7f8e\u56fd\u519b\u4e8b\u6280\u672f\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u5728\u82cf\u5dde\u3001\u5929\u6d25\u548c\u91cd\u5e86\u5f00\u5c55 G2G 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RCEP\uff09\u53ef\u4ee5\u63d0\u4f9b\u90e8\u5206\u7f13\u51b2\uff0c\u4f46\u9886\u5bfc\u5c42\u4e5f\u627f\u8ba4\uff0c\u8981\u540c\u65f6\u63a8\u8fdb\u4e0e\u4e24\u4e2a\u5927\u56fd\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u9700\u8981\u653f\u5e9c\u3001\u4f01\u4e1a\u548c\u793e\u4f1a\u7075\u6d3b\u5e94\u5bf9\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u5bf9\u534e\u5173\u7cfb\u5e76\u975e\u4e0e\u5bf9\u7f8e\u5173\u7cfb\u5206\u5f00\u7684\u8f68\u9053\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u5168\u65b9\u4f4d\u6218\u7565\u4e2d\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u90e8\u5206\u3002\n\n## \u53f0\u6e7e\u3001\u9999\u6e2f\u4e0e\u6469\u64e6\u70b9\n\n\u82e5\u5e72\u8bae\u9898\u8003\u9a8c\u7740\u53cc\u65b9\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u7684\u754c\u9650\u3002**\u53f0\u6e7e**\u662f\u5176\u4e2d\u6700\u654f\u611f\u7684\u8bae\u9898\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e8e 1965 \u5e74\u72ec\u7acb\u65f6\u627f\u8ba4\u4e2d\u534e\u6c11\u56fd\uff0c\u5e76\u4e8e 1990 \u5e74\u8f6c\u800c\u627f\u8ba4\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\uff0c\u4f46\u957f\u671f\u4e0e\u53f0\u5317\u7ef4\u6301\u975e\u5b98\u65b9\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u5305\u62ec\u59cb\u4e8e 1970\u5e74\u4ee3\u3001\u5317\u4eac\u8ba4\u4e3a\u4e0d\u7b26\u5408\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e2d\u56fd\u539f\u5219\u7684\u519b\u4e8b\u8bad\u7ec3\u5b89\u6392\u3002**2016 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708**\uff0c\u4e5d\u8f86\u5728\u53f0\u6e7e\u8bad\u7ec3\u540e\u8fd4\u7a0b\u7684\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6b66\u88c5\u90e8\u961f **Terrex** \u6b65\u5175\u8fd0\u5175\u8f66\u5728\u9999\u6e2f\u88ab\u6263\u62bc\u4e24\u4e2a\u6708\uff0c\u7406\u7531\u662f\u8fd0\u8f93\u8bb8\u53ef\u8bc1\u5b58\u5728\u95ee\u9898\uff1b\u6b64\u4e8b\u6210\u4e3a\u5916\u4ea4\u4e89\u7aef\u7126\u70b9\u3002\u5317\u4eac\u63d0\u51fa\u6297\u8bae\uff0c\u5e76\u8b66\u544a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0d\u8981\u4e0e\u53f0\u6e7e\u8fdb\u884c\u519b\u4e8b\u4ea4\u6d41\uff1b\u9999\u6e2f\u5728\u8c03\u67e5\u540e\u4e8e **2017 \u5e74\u4e00\u6708** \u653e\u884c\u8f66\u8f86\uff08[MINDEF\uff0c2016 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708](https:\/\/www.mindef.gov.sg\/news-and-events\/latest-releases\/25nov16_nr2\/)\uff09\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6ca1\u6709\u653e\u5f03\u5728\u53f0\u6e7e\u8fdb\u884c\u8bad\u7ec3\uff0c\u4f46\u8fd9\u8d77\u4e8b\u4ef6\u8868\u660e\uff0c\u4e24\u5cb8\u653f\u6cbb\u53ef\u80fd\u5f71\u54cd\u5546\u4e1a\u7269\u6d41\u3002**\u9999\u6e2f**\u662f\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4f01\u4e1a\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u91d1\u878d\u67a2\u7ebd\u548c\u4e2d\u8f6c\u70b9\uff1b\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u516c\u5f00\u58f0\u660e\u4e2d\u901a\u5e38\u8ba4\u540c\u5317\u4eac\u5bf9\u201c\u4e00\u56fd\u4e24\u5236\u201d\u7684\u8868\u8ff0\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u4fdd\u7559\u81ea\u8eab\u7684\u6cd5\u5f8b\u548c\u79fb\u6c11\u5236\u5ea6\u3002\u5357\u6d77\u4e3b\u6743\u4e89\u7aef\u662f\u53e6\u4e00\u4e2a\u6469\u64e6\u6765\u6e90\uff1a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0d\u4e3b\u5f20\u9886\u571f\uff0c\u4f46\u652f\u6301\u822a\u884c\u81ea\u7531\u548c\u4ee5\u89c4\u5219\u4e3a\u57fa\u7840\u7684\u79e9\u5e8f\uff1b\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7acb\u573a\u6709\u65f6\u4e0e\u5317\u4eac\u4e0d\u540c\u3002\u5728\u56fd\u5185\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u534e\u65cf\u4eba\u53e3\u5360\u591a\u6570\uff0c\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u6709\u6587\u5316\u548c\u8bed\u8a00\u8054\u7cfb\uff0c\u4f46\u653f\u5e9c\u5f3a\u8c03\u72ec\u7279\u7684\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4eba\u8eab\u4efd\u2014\u2014\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u62d2\u7edd\u88ab\u8d34\u4e0a\u4eb2\u4e2d\u56fd\u6807\u7b7e\u7684\u539f\u56e0\u4e4b\u4e00\uff0c\u5c3d\u7ba1\u53cc\u65b9\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e00\u4f53\u5316\u7a0b\u5ea6\u5f88\u9ad8\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7d27\u5f20\u5173\u7cfb\u5e76\u672a\u62b9\u6740\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u7684\u6df1\u5ea6\uff0c\u4f46\u8bf4\u660e\u4e86\u4e3a\u4f55\u65b0\u4e2d\u5173\u7cfb\u5e38\u88ab\u63cf\u8ff0\u4e3a\u683c\u5916\u5bc6\u5207\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u59cb\u7ec8\u4fdd\u7559\u9632\u5907\u3002","summary":"\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u5176\u6700\u6df1\u539a\u7684\u53cc\u8fb9\u5173\u7cfb\u4e4b\u4e00\uff1a\u81ea 1990 \u5e74\u5efa\u7acb\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\u4ee5\u6765\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u81ea 2013 \u5e74\u8d77\u6210\u4e3a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u6700\u5927\u7684\u5916\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff1b\u53cc\u65b9\u6709\u4e09\u4e2a\u65d7\u8230\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u548c\u5206\u9636\u6bb5\u5347\u7ea7\u7684\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u800c\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5173\u7cfb\u90fd\u7f6e\u4e8e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u4fdd\u6301\u5e73\u8861\u7684\u66f4\u5e7f\u6cdb\u5e03\u5c40\u4e2d\u3002","title":"\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u5173\u7cfb"}},"source_id":"sgkb.foreign-relations.china-relations","status":"verified","summary_en":"Singapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China is one of its deepest bilateral ties: formal diplomatic relations since 1990, China as Singapore's largest trading partner since 2013, Singapore as China's largest foreign investor, three flagship government-to-government projects, and a layered free-trade agreement \u2014 all managed within Singapore's wider balancing act between Beijing and Washington.","summary_zh":"\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u5176\u6700\u6df1\u539a\u7684\u53cc\u8fb9\u5173\u7cfb\u4e4b\u4e00\uff1a\u81ea 1990 \u5e74\u5efa\u7acb\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\u4ee5\u6765\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u81ea 2013 \u5e74\u8d77\u6210\u4e3a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u6700\u5927\u7684\u5916\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff1b\u53cc\u65b9\u6709\u4e09\u4e2a\u65d7\u8230\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u548c\u5206\u9636\u6bb5\u5347\u7ea7\u7684\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u800c\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5173\u7cfb\u90fd\u7f6e\u4e8e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u4fdd\u6301\u5e73\u8861\u7684\u66f4\u5e7f\u6cdb\u5e03\u5c40\u4e2d\u3002","title_en":"Singapore\u2013China Relations","title_zh":"\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u5173\u7cfb","wiki":{"domain":"foreign-relations","last_verified":"2026-08-08","locales":{"en":{"markdown":"# Singapore\u2013China Relations\n\nSingapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is among the deepest and most economically consequential in its foreign policy. Formal diplomatic relations were established on **3 October 1990**, but ties had been building for years through trade offices, leader visits, and the shared reform-era dialogue between the founding Prime Minister and Deng Xiaoping. Today the partnership spans annual top-level summits, three flagship government-to-government projects on the Chinese mainland, a multi-stage free-trade agreement, and dense people-to-people flows \u2014 all conducted within Singapore's wider [foreign policy doctrine](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine) of refusing to choose between Beijing and Washington. Since **2013**, China has been Singapore's largest trading partner and Singapore has been China's largest foreign investor ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)).\n\n## Historical foundations and diplomatic recognition\n\nSingapore\u2013China relations predate formal diplomacy. The founding Prime Minister made his first official visit to China in **May 1976**; Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore in **November 1978**, and Singapore officials have long credited that trip with reinforcing China's reform direction ([NLB HistorySG, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)). A trade agreement was signed in **December 1979**, and both sides opened trade representative offices in **1981** \u2014 practical links that made the eventual embassy exchange largely a formality. Singapore nevertheless delayed full recognition longer than most of its neighbours. It was the last of the original five [ASEAN](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean) founders to normalise ties with Beijing, waiting until **Indonesia** resumed relations in **August 1990** so as not to be seen as a \"third China\" in a region where ethnic-Chinese minorities were politically sensitive ([NLB HistorySG, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)). Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signed the joint communiqu\u00e9 at the United Nations in New York on **3 October 1990**, and both countries upgraded trade offices to embassies ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/wjb\/zzjg_663340\/tyfls_665260\/tyfl_665264\/2631_665276\/202406\/t20240606_11405547.html)). The relationship deepened through the **China\u2013Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park** (launched **1994**), the first of three government-to-government showcases, and in **2015** leaders marked 25 years of ties with a joint statement characterising relations as an \"All-Round Cooperative Partnership Progressing with the Times\" ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). Singapore recognises the PRC as the sole government of China under its one-China policy; that formal position coexists with long-standing unofficial links to Taiwan discussed below.\n\n## Institutional framework and people-to-people ties\n\nSingapore\u2013China cooperation is steered through layered institutions rather than a single treaty umbrella. The **Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC)** \u2014 co-chaired at deputy-prime-minister or vice-premier level \u2014 is the apex annual forum, typically producing dozens of memoranda across trade, sustainability, education, and health. The **19th JCBC** in Tianjin in **December 2023** yielded **24** cooperation outcomes, the highest in recent years, including the latest free-trade upgrade and a mutual visa-exemption arrangement ([CNA, Dec 2023](https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/upgraded-singapore-china-free-trade-agreement-24-signed-annual-top-level-meeting-3972101)). Below JCBC sit sectoral councils with Chinese provinces and municipalities \u2014 Sichuan, Shandong, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shanghai among them \u2014 and working groups on the three government-to-government projects. Singapore maintains an embassy in Beijing and consulates-general in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Xiamen ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). Party-to-party exchanges between the People's Action Party and the Communist Party of China run alongside government diplomacy. People-to-people ties are substantial: since the mid-1990s, more than **50,000** Chinese officials have attended study visits and training programmes in Singapore ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). From **9 February 2024**, holders of ordinary passports from either country may enter the other visa-free for up to **30 days** for business, tourism, family visits, or private affairs \u2014 a reciprocal arrangement announced at JCBC 2023 and implemented through an exchange of diplomatic notes ([ICA, Jan 2024](https:\/\/www.ica.gov.sg\/news-and-publications\/newsroom\/media-release\/mutual-30-day-visa-exemption-arrangement-between-singapore-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china)).\n\n## Trade, investment, and the China\u2013Singapore Free Trade Agreement\n\nThe economic relationship is the partnership's backbone. Since **2013**, China has been Singapore's largest trading partner ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). In **2024**, Singapore's merchandise exports to mainland China totalled **S$94.4 billion** and imports **S$75.7 billion**, making China the top partner on both sides of the ledger in the MTI trade tables ([MTI, 2024](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/-\/media\/MTI\/Resources\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore\/2024\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore-2024\/FullReport_AES2024.pdf)). Investment flows run both ways. Singapore has been China's largest source of new foreign investment for **13 consecutive years** from 2013, and in **April 2022** became China's largest cumulative foreign investor, surpassing Japan ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/)). Chinese investment into Singapore is also significant: mainland China accounted for **S$18.2 billion** of Singapore's inward FDI flows in **2024** and **S$14.0 billion** in **2025** ([SingStat, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/data.gov.sg\/datasets\/d_c8a2af8867a601e1b34cf84d634486dc\/view)). Legal architecture for commerce rests on the **China\u2013Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA)**, China's first comprehensive bilateral FTA with an Asian country, which entered into force on **1 January 2009**. An upgrade protocol was signed in **November 2018**; a **Further Upgrade Protocol** signed in **December 2023** shifted services and investment toward a negative-list model and expanded digital-economy cooperation, entering into force on **31 December 2024** ([MTI, Dec 2023](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/china-and-singapore-sign-the-china-singapore-free-trade-agreement-further-upgrade-protocol-to-deepen-cooperation\/); [Enterprise Singapore, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.enterprisesg.gov.sg\/-\/media\/ESG\/files\/Non-Financial-Assistance\/For-Companies\/Free-Trade-Agreements\/CSFTA\/CSFTA_Protocol_2023)). Financial connectivity complements goods and services trade: a bilateral local-currency swap facility has been renewed at **RMB 300 billion \/ S$65 billion**, and Singapore hosts offshore RMB clearing and RQFII access for Chinese institutions ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/)).\n\n## Government-to-government projects and strategic connectivity\n\nThree flagship **government-to-government (G2G)** projects anchor Singapore's economic diplomacy with China, each reflecting a different phase of Chinese development. The **China\u2013Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP)**, agreed in **1994**, was the first and became a model for industrial zones and urban management in the reform era. The **Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City**, whose groundbreaking was in **2008**, was conceived as a showcase for environmentally sustainable urban planning. The **China\u2013Singapore (Chongqing) Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity (CCI)**, launched in **November 2015** during President Xi Jinping's state visit, differs from its predecessors: rather than a bounded township, it is a network project focused on financial services, aviation, transport and logistics, and information and communications technology, framed by both sides as a priority demonstration project under China's **Belt and Road Initiative** ([MTI, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)). The **CCI Southern Transport Corridor (CCI-STC)**, established in **2017**, links Chongqing by rail to Qinzhou on the Beibu Gulf and onward by sea to Singapore and beyond \u2014 described by Chinese leaders as connecting the overland Silk Road Economic Belt with the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road ([MTI, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)). Guangxi, Guizhou, and Gansu have joined the corridor platform. Beyond the three G2G projects, Singapore supports state-level and private-sector-led platforms including the China\u2013Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City, the Singapore\u2013Sichuan Hi-Tech Innovation Park, and the Singapore\u2013China (Shenzhen) Smart City Initiative ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)).\n\n## Balancing Beijing and Washington\n\nSingapore's China relationship sits inside a wider posture of refusing to choose between major powers \u2014 the central tension in its [foreign policy doctrine](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine). Singapore is neither a US treaty ally nor a Chinese security partner; it hosts US naval logistics facilities and buys American military technology while running G2G projects in Suzhou, Tianjin, and Chongqing and maintaining dense party-to-party and business links with Beijing. The Prime Minister has described the stance as \"pro-Singapore\" rather than pro-China or pro-America, warning that forcing countries to pick sides could destabilise the region ([ST, Sep 2024](https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan)). The Foreign Minister has said Singapore delivers the same message to both capitals, will remain open to businesses from both countries, and aims to be useful without being \"made use of\" ([ST, Sep 2024](https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan)). US\u2013China technology export controls, supply-chain restructuring, and tariff disputes have made this balancing act materially harder since the late 2010s. Singapore's leadership argues that full economic decoupling would damage both superpowers and the wider region, and that ASEAN centrality plus dense trade agreements (including the CPTPP and RCEP) offer partial insulation \u2014 but acknowledges that advancing relations with both powers simultaneously requires agility from government, business, and society. The China relationship is therefore not a separate track from US ties but one compartment of a single omni-directional strategy.\n\n## Taiwan, Hong Kong, and friction points\n\nSeveral issues test the partnership's limits. **Taiwan** is the most sensitive. Singapore recognised the Republic of China at independence in 1965 and switched recognition to the PRC in 1990, but it has maintained long-standing unofficial ties with Taipei, including military training arrangements dating from the 1970s that Beijing opposes as incompatible with the one-China principle. The **November 2016** detention in Hong Kong of nine Singapore Armed Forces **Terrex** infantry carrier vehicles returning from training in Taiwan \u2014 held for two months over shipping-permit irregularities \u2014 became a diplomatic flashpoint. Beijing lodged a protest and warned against military exchanges with Taiwan; Hong Kong released the vehicles in **January 2017** after investigation ([MINDEF, Nov 2016](https:\/\/www.mindef.gov.sg\/news-and-events\/latest-releases\/25nov16_nr2\/)). Singapore did not abandon Taiwan training but the incident illustrated how cross-strait politics can intrude on commercial logistics. **Hong Kong** matters as a financial hub and transit point for Singaporean business; Singapore has generally aligned with Beijing's \"one country, two systems\" framing in public statements while preserving its own legal and immigration systems. South China Sea sovereignty disputes are another friction vector: Singapore does not claim territory but advocates freedom of navigation and a rules-based order, positions that sometimes diverge from Beijing's. Domestically, Singapore's ethnic-Chinese majority shares cultural and linguistic ties with China, yet the government stresses a distinct Singaporean identity \u2014 part of why leaders resist being labelled pro-China despite deep economic integration. These tensions do not negate the partnership's depth, but they explain why Singapore\u2013China relations are often described as uniquely close yet permanently hedged.","summary":"Singapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China is one of its deepest bilateral ties: formal diplomatic relations since 1990, China as Singapore's largest trading partner since 2013, Singapore as China's largest foreign investor, three flagship government-to-government projects, and a layered free-trade agreement \u2014 all managed within Singapore's wider balancing act between Beijing and Washington.","title":"Singapore\u2013China Relations"},"zh":{"markdown":"# \u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u5173\u7cfb\n\n\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\uff08PRC\uff09\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u5176\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u4e2d\u6700\u6df1\u539a\u3001\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5f71\u54cd\u6700\u91cd\u5927\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u4e4b\u4e00\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u4e8e **1990\u5e74\u5341\u6708 3 \u65e5** \u5efa\u7acb\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u4f46\u591a\u5e74\u6765\u5df2\u901a\u8fc7\u8d38\u6613\u529e\u4e8b\u5904\u3001\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u4e92\u8bbf\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u5efa\u56fd\u603b\u7406\u4e0e\u9093\u5c0f\u5e73\u4e4b\u95f4\u56f4\u7ed5\u6539\u9769\u65f6\u671f\u7684\u5171\u540c\u5bf9\u8bdd\u9010\u6b65\u5efa\u7acb\u8054\u7cfb\u3002\u5982\u4eca\uff0c\u53cc\u65b9\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u6db5\u76d6\u5e74\u5ea6\u9ad8\u5c42\u5cf0\u4f1a\u3001\u4e2d\u56fd\u5927\u9646\u4e09\u4e2a\u65d7\u8230\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u3001\u591a\u9636\u6bb5\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\u4ee5\u53ca\u5bc6\u5207\u7684\u6c11\u95f4\u5f80\u6765\u2014\u2014\u6240\u6709\u8fd9\u4e9b\u90fd\u5904\u4e8e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u66f4\u5e7f\u6cdb\u7684[\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u539f\u5219](\/zh\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine)\u4e4b\u4e2d\uff0c\u5373\u4e0d\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u9009\u8fb9\u7ad9\u3002\u81ea **2013 \u5e74** 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\u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/china-and-singapore-sign-the-china-singapore-free-trade-agreement-further-upgrade-protocol-to-deepen-cooperation\/)\uff1b[Enterprise Singapore\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.enterprisesg.gov.sg\/-\/media\/ESG\/files\/Non-Financial-Assistance\/For-Companies\/Free-Trade-Agreements\/CSFTA\/CSFTA_Protocol_2023)\uff09\u3002\u91d1\u878d\u4e92\u8054\u4e92\u901a\u4e3a\u5546\u54c1\u548c\u670d\u52a1\u8d38\u6613\u63d0\u4f9b\u8865\u5145\uff1a\u53cc\u65b9\u5df2\u7eed\u7b7e\u53cc\u8fb9\u672c\u5e01\u4e92\u6362\u5b89\u6392\uff0c\u989d\u5ea6\u4e3a **300 \u5341\u4ebf\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01 \/ 65 \u5341\u4ebf\u65b0\u5143**\uff1b\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e5f\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd\u673a\u6784\u63d0\u4f9b\u79bb\u5cb8\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01\u6e05\u7b97\u548c\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01\u5408\u683c\u5883\u5916\u673a\u6784\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff08RQFII\uff09\u6e20\u9053\uff08[PRC MFA\uff0c2026 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\u5960\u57fa\uff0c\u65e8\u5728\u5c55\u793a\u73af\u5883\u53ef\u6301\u7eed\u7684\u57ce\u5e02\u89c4\u5212\u3002**\u4e2d\u65b0\uff08\u91cd\u5e86\uff09\u4e92\u8054\u4e92\u901a\u6218\u7565\u6027\u793a\u8303\u9879\u76ee\uff08CCI\uff09**\u4e8e **2015 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708** \u4e60\u8fd1\u5e73\u4e3b\u5e2d\u56fd\u4e8b\u8bbf\u95ee\u671f\u95f4\u542f\u52a8\uff0c\u4e0e\u524d\u4e24\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u4e0d\u540c\uff1a\u5b83\u5e76\u975e\u8fb9\u754c\u660e\u786e\u7684\u57ce\u9547\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u805a\u7126\u91d1\u878d\u670d\u52a1\u3001\u822a\u7a7a\u3001\u4ea4\u901a\u7269\u6d41\u4ee5\u53ca\u4fe1\u606f\u901a\u4fe1\u6280\u672f\u7684\u7f51\u7edc\u578b\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u53cc\u65b9\u5c06\u5176\u5b9a\u4f4d\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd**\u201c\u4e00\u5e26\u4e00\u8def\u201d\u5021\u8bae**\u4e0b\u7684\u4f18\u5148\u793a\u8303\u9879\u76ee\uff08[MTI\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)\uff09\u3002**CCI \u5357\u5411\u8fd0\u8f93\u901a\u9053\uff08CCI-STC\uff09**\u4e8e **2017 \u5e74** \u5efa\u7acb\uff0c\u901a\u8fc7\u94c1\u8def\u5c06\u91cd\u5e86\u8fde\u63a5\u81f3\u5317\u90e8\u6e7e\u7684\u94a6\u5dde\uff0c\u518d\u7ecf\u6d77\u8def\u901a\u5f80\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u53ca\u5176\u4ed6\u5730\u533a\u2014\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u79f0\u4e4b\u4e3a\u8fde\u63a5\u9646\u4e0a\u4e1d\u7ef8\u4e4b\u8def\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5e26\u4e0e 21\u4e16\u7eaa\u6d77\u4e0a\u4e1d\u7ef8\u4e4b\u8def\u7684\u901a\u9053\uff08[MTI\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)\uff09\u3002\u5e7f\u897f\u3001\u8d35\u5dde\u548c\u7518\u8083\u5df2\u52a0\u5165\u8fd9\u4e00\u901a\u9053\u5408\u4f5c\u5e73\u53f0\u3002\u9664\u4e09\u4e2a 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\u5e74\u8f6c\u800c\u627f\u8ba4\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\uff0c\u4f46\u957f\u671f\u4e0e\u53f0\u5317\u7ef4\u6301\u975e\u5b98\u65b9\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u5305\u62ec\u59cb\u4e8e 1970\u5e74\u4ee3\u3001\u5317\u4eac\u8ba4\u4e3a\u4e0d\u7b26\u5408\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e2d\u56fd\u539f\u5219\u7684\u519b\u4e8b\u8bad\u7ec3\u5b89\u6392\u3002**2016 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708**\uff0c\u4e5d\u8f86\u5728\u53f0\u6e7e\u8bad\u7ec3\u540e\u8fd4\u7a0b\u7684\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6b66\u88c5\u90e8\u961f **Terrex** \u6b65\u5175\u8fd0\u5175\u8f66\u5728\u9999\u6e2f\u88ab\u6263\u62bc\u4e24\u4e2a\u6708\uff0c\u7406\u7531\u662f\u8fd0\u8f93\u8bb8\u53ef\u8bc1\u5b58\u5728\u95ee\u9898\uff1b\u6b64\u4e8b\u6210\u4e3a\u5916\u4ea4\u4e89\u7aef\u7126\u70b9\u3002\u5317\u4eac\u63d0\u51fa\u6297\u8bae\uff0c\u5e76\u8b66\u544a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0d\u8981\u4e0e\u53f0\u6e7e\u8fdb\u884c\u519b\u4e8b\u4ea4\u6d41\uff1b\u9999\u6e2f\u5728\u8c03\u67e5\u540e\u4e8e **2017 \u5e74\u4e00\u6708** \u653e\u884c\u8f66\u8f86\uff08[MINDEF\uff0c2016 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708](https:\/\/www.mindef.gov.sg\/news-and-events\/latest-releases\/25nov16_nr2\/)\uff09\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6ca1\u6709\u653e\u5f03\u5728\u53f0\u6e7e\u8fdb\u884c\u8bad\u7ec3\uff0c\u4f46\u8fd9\u8d77\u4e8b\u4ef6\u8868\u660e\uff0c\u4e24\u5cb8\u653f\u6cbb\u53ef\u80fd\u5f71\u54cd\u5546\u4e1a\u7269\u6d41\u3002**\u9999\u6e2f**\u662f\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4f01\u4e1a\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u91d1\u878d\u67a2\u7ebd\u548c\u4e2d\u8f6c\u70b9\uff1b\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u516c\u5f00\u58f0\u660e\u4e2d\u901a\u5e38\u8ba4\u540c\u5317\u4eac\u5bf9\u201c\u4e00\u56fd\u4e24\u5236\u201d\u7684\u8868\u8ff0\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u4fdd\u7559\u81ea\u8eab\u7684\u6cd5\u5f8b\u548c\u79fb\u6c11\u5236\u5ea6\u3002\u5357\u6d77\u4e3b\u6743\u4e89\u7aef\u662f\u53e6\u4e00\u4e2a\u6469\u64e6\u6765\u6e90\uff1a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0d\u4e3b\u5f20\u9886\u571f\uff0c\u4f46\u652f\u6301\u822a\u884c\u81ea\u7531\u548c\u4ee5\u89c4\u5219\u4e3a\u57fa\u7840\u7684\u79e9\u5e8f\uff1b\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7acb\u573a\u6709\u65f6\u4e0e\u5317\u4eac\u4e0d\u540c\u3002\u5728\u56fd\u5185\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u534e\u65cf\u4eba\u53e3\u5360\u591a\u6570\uff0c\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u6709\u6587\u5316\u548c\u8bed\u8a00\u8054\u7cfb\uff0c\u4f46\u653f\u5e9c\u5f3a\u8c03\u72ec\u7279\u7684\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4eba\u8eab\u4efd\u2014\u2014\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u62d2\u7edd\u88ab\u8d34\u4e0a\u4eb2\u4e2d\u56fd\u6807\u7b7e\u7684\u539f\u56e0\u4e4b\u4e00\uff0c\u5c3d\u7ba1\u53cc\u65b9\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e00\u4f53\u5316\u7a0b\u5ea6\u5f88\u9ad8\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7d27\u5f20\u5173\u7cfb\u5e76\u672a\u62b9\u6740\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u7684\u6df1\u5ea6\uff0c\u4f46\u8bf4\u660e\u4e86\u4e3a\u4f55\u65b0\u4e2d\u5173\u7cfb\u5e38\u88ab\u63cf\u8ff0\u4e3a\u683c\u5916\u5bc6\u5207\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u59cb\u7ec8\u4fdd\u7559\u9632\u5907\u3002","summary":"\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u5176\u6700\u6df1\u539a\u7684\u53cc\u8fb9\u5173\u7cfb\u4e4b\u4e00\uff1a\u81ea 1990 \u5e74\u5efa\u7acb\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\u4ee5\u6765\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u81ea 2013 \u5e74\u8d77\u6210\u4e3a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u6700\u5927\u7684\u5916\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff1b\u53cc\u65b9\u6709\u4e09\u4e2a\u65d7\u8230\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u548c\u5206\u9636\u6bb5\u5347\u7ea7\u7684\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u800c\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5173\u7cfb\u90fd\u7f6e\u4e8e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u4fdd\u6301\u5e73\u8861\u7684\u66f4\u5e7f\u6cdb\u5e03\u5c40\u4e2d\u3002","title":"\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u5173\u7cfb"}},"path":"foreign-relations\/china-relations.md","related_source_ids":["sgkb.foreign-relations.asean","sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine","sgkb.foreign-relations.indonesia-relations","sgkb.foreign-relations.singapore-malaysia-relations","sgkb.economy-finance.trade-and-fta-network","sgkb.foreign-relations.us-relations"],"source_hash":"18b72a78268ead27a61458dceade61120ee5691fac2f69c3877d2432cadf70c9","source_revision":"094b7bf3a1ab75da7b1952ee33089c1733835fe6","sources":[{"title":"MFA \u2014 People's Republic of China","url":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/"},{"title":"PRC MFA \u2014 Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Singapore","url":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/wjb\/zzjg_663340\/tyfls_665260\/tyfl_665264\/2631_665276\/202406\/t20240606_11405547.html"},{"title":"MTI \u2014 Economic Survey of Singapore 2024","url":"https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/-\/media\/MTI\/Resources\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore\/2024\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore-2024\/FullReport_AES2024.pdf"},{"title":"MTI \u2014 CSFTA Further Upgrade Protocol signed","url":"https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/china-and-singapore-sign-the-china-singapore-free-trade-agreement-further-upgrade-protocol-to-deepen-cooperation\/"},{"title":"Enterprise Singapore \u2014 CSFTA Further Upgrade Protocol legal text","url":"https:\/\/www.enterprisesg.gov.sg\/-\/media\/ESG\/files\/Non-Financial-Assistance\/For-Companies\/Free-Trade-Agreements\/CSFTA\/CSFTA_Protocol_2023"},{"title":"MTI \u2014 Chan Chun Sing on Chongqing Connectivity Initiative","url":"https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/"},{"title":"ICA \u2014 Mutual 30-day visa exemption with China","url":"https:\/\/www.ica.gov.sg\/news-and-publications\/newsroom\/media-release\/mutual-30-day-visa-exemption-arrangement-between-singapore-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china"},{"title":"SingStat \u2014 Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore by Source Economy (Flows)","url":"https:\/\/data.gov.sg\/datasets\/d_c8a2af8867a601e1b34cf84d634486dc\/view"},{"title":"PRC MFA \u2014 Singapore bilateral relations page (Chinese)","url":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/"},{"title":"MINDEF \u2014 Update on Terrex ICVs detained in Hong Kong","url":"https:\/\/www.mindef.gov.sg\/news-and-events\/latest-releases\/25nov16_nr2\/"},{"title":"The Straits Times \u2014 Vivian Balakrishnan on US and China relations","url":"https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan"},{"title":"CNA \u2014 CSFTA further upgrade at 19th JCBC","url":"https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/upgraded-singapore-china-free-trade-agreement-24-signed-annual-top-level-meeting-3972101"},{"title":"NLB HistorySG \u2014 Singapore establishes diplomatic relations with China","url":"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd"}]}},"search_text":"Singapore\u2013China Relations\n\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u5173\u7cfb\nSingapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China is one of its deepest bilateral ties: formal diplomatic relations since 1990, China as Singapore's largest trading partner since 2013, Singapore as China's largest foreign investor, three flagship government-to-government projects, and a layered free-trade agreement \u2014 all managed within Singapore's wider balancing act between Beijing and Washington.\n\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u5176\u6700\u6df1\u539a\u7684\u53cc\u8fb9\u5173\u7cfb\u4e4b\u4e00\uff1a\u81ea 1990 \u5e74\u5efa\u7acb\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\u4ee5\u6765\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u81ea 2013 \u5e74\u8d77\u6210\u4e3a\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u6700\u5927\u7684\u5916\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff1b\u53cc\u65b9\u6709\u4e09\u4e2a\u65d7\u8230\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u548c\u5206\u9636\u6bb5\u5347\u7ea7\u7684\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u800c\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5173\u7cfb\u90fd\u7f6e\u4e8e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u4fdd\u6301\u5e73\u8861\u7684\u66f4\u5e7f\u6cdb\u5e03\u5c40\u4e2d\u3002\n{\"aliases\":[\"China relations\",\"Singapore-China bilateral ties\",\"SG-CN relations\",\"PRC relations\"],\"aliases_i18n\":[],\"classification_confidence\":\"medium\",\"classification_source\":\"domain-default\",\"document_id\":\"sgkb.foreign-relations.china-relations\",\"document_sha256\":\"de5198349d2dff8039b9a262eb58af45d261a1c22219ced11b4d4c8505f99de9\",\"document_type\":\"article\",\"domain\":\"foreign-relations\",\"entities\":[\"cn.republic.china\"],\"facets\":[\"business\",\"controversy\",\"geography\",\"policy\"],\"geographic_scope\":[\"national\",\"international\"],\"jurisdiction\":\"SG\",\"language\":\"en\",\"last_verified\":\"2026-08-08\",\"path\":\"foreign-relations\\\/china-relations.md\",\"related\":[\"asean\",\"foreign-policy-doctrine\",\"indonesia-relations\",\"singapore-malaysia-relations\",\"trade-and-fta-network\",\"us-relations\"],\"sources\":[{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"MFA \u2014 People's Republic of China\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.mfa.gov.sg\\\/about-mfa\\\/foreign-policy\\\/countries-and-regions\\\/peoples-republic-of-china\\\/\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"PRC MFA \u2014 Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Singapore\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.mfa.gov.cn\\\/eng\\\/wjb\\\/zzjg_663340\\\/tyfls_665260\\\/tyfl_665264\\\/2631_665276\\\/202406\\\/t20240606_11405547.html\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"MTI \u2014 Economic Survey of Singapore 2024\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.mti.gov.sg\\\/-\\\/media\\\/MTI\\\/Resources\\\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore\\\/2024\\\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore-2024\\\/FullReport_AES2024.pdf\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"MTI \u2014 CSFTA Further Upgrade Protocol signed\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.mti.gov.sg\\\/newsroom\\\/china-and-singapore-sign-the-china-singapore-free-trade-agreement-further-upgrade-protocol-to-deepen-cooperation\\\/\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"Enterprise Singapore \u2014 CSFTA Further Upgrade Protocol legal text\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.enterprisesg.gov.sg\\\/-\\\/media\\\/ESG\\\/files\\\/Non-Financial-Assistance\\\/For-Companies\\\/Free-Trade-Agreements\\\/CSFTA\\\/CSFTA_Protocol_2023\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"MTI \u2014 Chan Chun Sing on Chongqing Connectivity Initiative\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.mti.gov.sg\\\/newsroom\\\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\\\/\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"ICA \u2014 Mutual 30-day visa exemption with China\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.ica.gov.sg\\\/news-and-publications\\\/newsroom\\\/media-release\\\/mutual-30-day-visa-exemption-arrangement-between-singapore-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"SingStat \u2014 Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore by Source Economy (Flows)\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/data.gov.sg\\\/datasets\\\/d_c8a2af8867a601e1b34cf84d634486dc\\\/view\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"PRC MFA \u2014 Singapore bilateral relations page (Chinese)\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.mfa.gov.cn\\\/web\\\/gjhdq_676201\\\/gj_676203\\\/yz_676205\\\/1206_677076\\\/sbgx_677080\\\/\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"MINDEF \u2014 Update on Terrex ICVs detained in Hong Kong\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.mindef.gov.sg\\\/news-and-events\\\/latest-releases\\\/25nov16_nr2\\\/\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"The Straits Times \u2014 Vivian Balakrishnan on US and China relations\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.straitstimes.com\\\/asia\\\/se-asia\\\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"CNA \u2014 CSFTA further upgrade at 19th JCBC\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.channelnewsasia.com\\\/singapore\\\/upgraded-singapore-china-free-trade-agreement-24-signed-annual-top-level-meeting-3972101\"},{\"accessed\":\"2026-08-08\",\"title\":\"NLB HistorySG \u2014 Singapore establishes diplomatic relations with China\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/web.archive.org\\\/web\\\/20200221004520\\\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\\\/history\\\/events\\\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd\"}],\"status\":\"verified\",\"summary\":\"Singapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China is one of its deepest bilateral ties: formal diplomatic relations since 1990, China as Singapore's largest trading partner since 2013, Singapore as China's largest foreign investor, three flagship government-to-government projects, and a layered free-trade agreement \u2014 all managed within Singapore's wider balancing act between Beijing and Washington.\",\"tags\":[\"policy\",\"concept\",\"investment\",\"controversy\"],\"temporal_scope\":\"mixed\",\"title\":\"Singapore\u2013China Relations\",\"topics\":[\"sgtopic.foreign-relations\",\"sgtopic.foreign-relations.china\"],\"volatility\":\"slow\"}\n# Singapore\u2013China Relations\n\nSingapore's relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is among the deepest and most economically consequential in its foreign policy. Formal diplomatic relations were established on **3 October 1990**, but ties had been building for years through trade offices, leader visits, and the shared reform-era dialogue between the founding Prime Minister and Deng Xiaoping. Today the partnership spans annual top-level summits, three flagship government-to-government projects on the Chinese mainland, a multi-stage free-trade agreement, and dense people-to-people flows \u2014 all conducted within Singapore's wider [foreign policy doctrine](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine) of refusing to choose between Beijing and Washington. Since **2013**, China has been Singapore's largest trading partner and Singapore has been China's largest foreign investor ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)).\n\n## Historical foundations and diplomatic recognition\n\nSingapore\u2013China relations predate formal diplomacy. The founding Prime Minister made his first official visit to China in **May 1976**; Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore in **November 1978**, and Singapore officials have long credited that trip with reinforcing China's reform direction ([NLB HistorySG, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)). A trade agreement was signed in **December 1979**, and both sides opened trade representative offices in **1981** \u2014 practical links that made the eventual embassy exchange largely a formality. Singapore nevertheless delayed full recognition longer than most of its neighbours. It was the last of the original five [ASEAN](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean) founders to normalise ties with Beijing, waiting until **Indonesia** resumed relations in **August 1990** so as not to be seen as a \"third China\" in a region where ethnic-Chinese minorities were politically sensitive ([NLB HistorySG, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)). Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signed the joint communiqu\u00e9 at the United Nations in New York on **3 October 1990**, and both countries upgraded trade offices to embassies ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/wjb\/zzjg_663340\/tyfls_665260\/tyfl_665264\/2631_665276\/202406\/t20240606_11405547.html)). The relationship deepened through the **China\u2013Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park** (launched **1994**), the first of three government-to-government showcases, and in **2015** leaders marked 25 years of ties with a joint statement characterising relations as an \"All-Round Cooperative Partnership Progressing with the Times\" ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). Singapore recognises the PRC as the sole government of China under its one-China policy; that formal position coexists with long-standing unofficial links to Taiwan discussed below.\n\n## Institutional framework and people-to-people ties\n\nSingapore\u2013China cooperation is steered through layered institutions rather than a single treaty umbrella. The **Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC)** \u2014 co-chaired at deputy-prime-minister or vice-premier level \u2014 is the apex annual forum, typically producing dozens of memoranda across trade, sustainability, education, and health. The **19th JCBC** in Tianjin in **December 2023** yielded **24** cooperation outcomes, the highest in recent years, including the latest free-trade upgrade and a mutual visa-exemption arrangement ([CNA, Dec 2023](https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/upgraded-singapore-china-free-trade-agreement-24-signed-annual-top-level-meeting-3972101)). Below JCBC sit sectoral councils with Chinese provinces and municipalities \u2014 Sichuan, Shandong, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shanghai among them \u2014 and working groups on the three government-to-government projects. Singapore maintains an embassy in Beijing and consulates-general in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Xiamen ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). Party-to-party exchanges between the People's Action Party and the Communist Party of China run alongside government diplomacy. People-to-people ties are substantial: since the mid-1990s, more than **50,000** Chinese officials have attended study visits and training programmes in Singapore ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). From **9 February 2024**, holders of ordinary passports from either country may enter the other visa-free for up to **30 days** for business, tourism, family visits, or private affairs \u2014 a reciprocal arrangement announced at JCBC 2023 and implemented through an exchange of diplomatic notes ([ICA, Jan 2024](https:\/\/www.ica.gov.sg\/news-and-publications\/newsroom\/media-release\/mutual-30-day-visa-exemption-arrangement-between-singapore-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china)).\n\n## Trade, investment, and the China\u2013Singapore Free Trade Agreement\n\nThe economic relationship is the partnership's backbone. Since **2013**, China has been Singapore's largest trading partner ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)). In **2024**, Singapore's merchandise exports to mainland China totalled **S$94.4 billion** and imports **S$75.7 billion**, making China the top partner on both sides of the ledger in the MTI trade tables ([MTI, 2024](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/-\/media\/MTI\/Resources\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore\/2024\/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore-2024\/FullReport_AES2024.pdf)). Investment flows run both ways. Singapore has been China's largest source of new foreign investment for **13 consecutive years** from 2013, and in **April 2022** became China's largest cumulative foreign investor, surpassing Japan ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/)). Chinese investment into Singapore is also significant: mainland China accounted for **S$18.2 billion** of Singapore's inward FDI flows in **2024** and **S$14.0 billion** in **2025** ([SingStat, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/data.gov.sg\/datasets\/d_c8a2af8867a601e1b34cf84d634486dc\/view)). Legal architecture for commerce rests on the **China\u2013Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA)**, China's first comprehensive bilateral FTA with an Asian country, which entered into force on **1 January 2009**. An upgrade protocol was signed in **November 2018**; a **Further Upgrade Protocol** signed in **December 2023** shifted services and investment toward a negative-list model and expanded digital-economy cooperation, entering into force on **31 December 2024** ([MTI, Dec 2023](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/china-and-singapore-sign-the-china-singapore-free-trade-agreement-further-upgrade-protocol-to-deepen-cooperation\/); [Enterprise Singapore, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.enterprisesg.gov.sg\/-\/media\/ESG\/files\/Non-Financial-Assistance\/For-Companies\/Free-Trade-Agreements\/CSFTA\/CSFTA_Protocol_2023)). Financial connectivity complements goods and services trade: a bilateral local-currency swap facility has been renewed at **RMB 300 billion \/ S$65 billion**, and Singapore hosts offshore RMB clearing and RQFII access for Chinese institutions ([PRC MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/web\/gjhdq_676201\/gj_676203\/yz_676205\/1206_677076\/sbgx_677080\/)).\n\n## Government-to-government projects and strategic connectivity\n\nThree flagship **government-to-government (G2G)** projects anchor Singapore's economic diplomacy with China, each reflecting a different phase of Chinese development. The **China\u2013Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP)**, agreed in **1994**, was the first and became a model for industrial zones and urban management in the reform era. The **Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City**, whose groundbreaking was in **2008**, was conceived as a showcase for environmentally sustainable urban planning. The **China\u2013Singapore (Chongqing) Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity (CCI)**, launched in **November 2015** during President Xi Jinping's state visit, differs from its predecessors: rather than a bounded township, it is a network project focused on financial services, aviation, transport and logistics, and information and communications technology, framed by both sides as a priority demonstration project under China's **Belt and Road Initiative** ([MTI, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)). The **CCI Southern Transport Corridor (CCI-STC)**, established in **2017**, links Chongqing by rail to Qinzhou on the Beibu Gulf and onward by sea to Singapore and beyond \u2014 described by Chinese leaders as connecting the overland Silk Road Economic Belt with the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road ([MTI, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mti.gov.sg\/newsroom\/minister-pmo--chan-chun-sing-s-oral-reply-on-the-chongqing-connectivity-innitiative-project\/)). Guangxi, Guizhou, and Gansu have joined the corridor platform. Beyond the three G2G projects, Singapore supports state-level and private-sector-led platforms including the China\u2013Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City, the Singapore\u2013Sichuan Hi-Tech Innovation Park, and the Singapore\u2013China (Shenzhen) Smart City Initiative ([MFA, accessed Aug 2026](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)).\n\n## Balancing Beijing and Washington\n\nSingapore's China relationship sits inside a wider posture of refusing to choose between major powers \u2014 the central tension in its [foreign policy doctrine](\/en\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine). Singapore is neither a US treaty ally nor a Chinese security partner; it hosts US naval logistics facilities and buys American military technology while running G2G projects in Suzhou, Tianjin, and Chongqing and maintaining dense party-to-party and business links with Beijing. The Prime Minister has described the stance as \"pro-Singapore\" rather than pro-China or pro-America, warning that forcing countries to pick sides could destabilise the region ([ST, Sep 2024](https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan)). The Foreign Minister has said Singapore delivers the same message to both capitals, will remain open to businesses from both countries, and aims to be useful without being \"made use of\" ([ST, Sep 2024](https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/singapore-will-be-useful-to-global-partners-but-not-be-made-use-of-vivian-balakrishnan)). US\u2013China technology export controls, supply-chain restructuring, and tariff disputes have made this balancing act materially harder since the late 2010s. Singapore's leadership argues that full economic decoupling would damage both superpowers and the wider region, and that ASEAN centrality plus dense trade agreements (including the CPTPP and RCEP) offer partial insulation \u2014 but acknowledges that advancing relations with both powers simultaneously requires agility from government, business, and society. The China relationship is therefore not a separate track from US ties but one compartment of a single omni-directional strategy.\n\n## Taiwan, Hong Kong, and friction points\n\nSeveral issues test the partnership's limits. **Taiwan** is the most sensitive. Singapore recognised the Republic of China at independence in 1965 and switched recognition to the PRC in 1990, but it has maintained long-standing unofficial ties with Taipei, including military training arrangements dating from the 1970s that Beijing opposes as incompatible with the one-China principle. The **November 2016** detention in Hong Kong of nine Singapore Armed Forces **Terrex** infantry carrier vehicles returning from training in Taiwan \u2014 held for two months over shipping-permit irregularities \u2014 became a diplomatic flashpoint. Beijing lodged a protest and warned against military exchanges with Taiwan; Hong Kong released the vehicles in **January 2017** after investigation ([MINDEF, Nov 2016](https:\/\/www.mindef.gov.sg\/news-and-events\/latest-releases\/25nov16_nr2\/)). Singapore did not abandon Taiwan training but the incident illustrated how cross-strait politics can intrude on commercial logistics. **Hong Kong** matters as a financial hub and transit point for Singaporean business; Singapore has generally aligned with Beijing's \"one country, two systems\" framing in public statements while preserving its own legal and immigration systems. South China Sea sovereignty disputes are another friction vector: Singapore does not claim territory but advocates freedom of navigation and a rules-based order, positions that sometimes diverge from Beijing's. Domestically, Singapore's ethnic-Chinese majority shares cultural and linguistic ties with China, yet the government stresses a distinct Singaporean identity \u2014 part of why leaders resist being labelled pro-China despite deep economic integration. These tensions do not negate the partnership's depth, but they explain why Singapore\u2013China relations are often described as uniquely close yet permanently hedged.\n# \u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u2014\u4e2d\u56fd\u5173\u7cfb\n\n\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e0e\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\uff08PRC\uff09\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u5176\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u4e2d\u6700\u6df1\u539a\u3001\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5f71\u54cd\u6700\u91cd\u5927\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u4e4b\u4e00\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u4e8e **1990\u5e74\u5341\u6708 3 \u65e5** \u5efa\u7acb\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u4f46\u591a\u5e74\u6765\u5df2\u901a\u8fc7\u8d38\u6613\u529e\u4e8b\u5904\u3001\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u4e92\u8bbf\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u5efa\u56fd\u603b\u7406\u4e0e\u9093\u5c0f\u5e73\u4e4b\u95f4\u56f4\u7ed5\u6539\u9769\u65f6\u671f\u7684\u5171\u540c\u5bf9\u8bdd\u9010\u6b65\u5efa\u7acb\u8054\u7cfb\u3002\u5982\u4eca\uff0c\u53cc\u65b9\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u6db5\u76d6\u5e74\u5ea6\u9ad8\u5c42\u5cf0\u4f1a\u3001\u4e2d\u56fd\u5927\u9646\u4e09\u4e2a\u65d7\u8230\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u3001\u591a\u9636\u6bb5\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\u4ee5\u53ca\u5bc6\u5207\u7684\u6c11\u95f4\u5f80\u6765\u2014\u2014\u6240\u6709\u8fd9\u4e9b\u90fd\u5904\u4e8e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u66f4\u5e7f\u6cdb\u7684[\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u539f\u5219](\/zh\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine)\u4e4b\u4e2d\uff0c\u5373\u4e0d\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u4e4b\u95f4\u9009\u8fb9\u7ad9\u3002\u81ea **2013 \u5e74** \u8d77\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e00\u76f4\u662f\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff0c\u800c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e00\u76f4\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u6700\u5927\u7684\u5916\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u8005\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002\n\n## \u5386\u53f2\u57fa\u7840\u4e0e\u5916\u4ea4\u627f\u8ba4\n\n\u65b0\u4e2d\u5173\u7cfb\u65e9\u4e8e\u6b63\u5f0f\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\u3002\u5efa\u56fd\u603b\u7406\u4e8e **1976 \u5e74\u4e94\u6708** \u9996\u6b21\u6b63\u5f0f\u8bbf\u95ee\u4e2d\u56fd\uff1b\u9093\u5c0f\u5e73\u4e8e **1978 \u5e74\u5341\u4e00\u6708** \u8bbf\u95ee\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5b98\u5458\u957f\u671f\u4ee5\u6765\u5c06\u8fd9\u6b21\u8bbf\u95ee\u89c6\u4e3a\u5de9\u56fa\u4e2d\u56fd\u6539\u9769\u65b9\u5411\u7684\u56e0\u7d20\uff08[NLB HistorySG\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)\uff09\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u4e8e **1979 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708** \u7b7e\u7f72\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u5e76\u4e8e **1981 \u5e74** \u4e92\u8bbe\u8d38\u6613\u4ee3\u8868\u5904\u2014\u2014\u8fd9\u4e9b\u52a1\u5b9e\u8054\u7cfb\u4f7f\u540e\u6765\u4e92\u8bbe\u5927\u4f7f\u9986\u51e0\u4e4e\u53ea\u662f\u624b\u7eed\u95ee\u9898\u3002\u7136\u800c\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6b63\u5f0f\u627f\u8ba4\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u65f6\u95f4\u4ecd\u6bd4\u5927\u591a\u6570\u90bb\u56fd\u66f4\u665a\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u662f\u6700\u521d\u4e94\u4e2a[\u4e1c\u76df](\/zh\/knowledge\/article\/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean)\u521b\u59cb\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u4e2d\u6700\u540e\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e0e\u5317\u4eac\u5b9e\u73b0\u5173\u7cfb\u6b63\u5e38\u5316\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\uff1b\u4e3a\u907f\u514d\u5728\u534e\u88d4\u5c11\u6570\u65cf\u7fa4\u653f\u6cbb\u654f\u611f\u7684\u5730\u533a\u88ab\u89c6\u4e3a\u201c\u7b2c\u4e09\u4e2a\u4e2d\u56fd\u201d\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u7b49\u5230**\u5370\u5ea6\u5c3c\u897f\u4e9a**\u4e8e **1990 \u5e74\u516b\u6708** \u6062\u590d\u5173\u7cfb\u540e\u624d\u91c7\u53d6\u884c\u52a8\uff08[NLB HistorySG\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20200221004520\/eresources.nlb.gov.sg\/history\/events\/4181dd20-df08-4ff5-8d93-620350b639fd)\uff09\u3002\u5916\u4ea4\u90e8\u957f\u9ec4\u6839\u6210\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u5916\u4ea4\u90e8\u957f\u94b1\u5176\u741b\u4e8e **1990 \u5e74\u5341\u6708 3 \u65e5** \u5728\u7ebd\u7ea6\u8054\u5408\u56fd\u7b7e\u7f72\u8054\u5408\u516c\u62a5\uff0c\u4e24\u56fd\u5e76\u5c06\u8d38\u6613\u529e\u4e8b\u5904\u5347\u683c\u4e3a\u5927\u4f7f\u9986\uff08[PRC MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/wjb\/zzjg_663340\/tyfls_665260\/tyfl_665264\/2631_665276\/202406\/t20240606_11405547.html)\uff09\u3002\u53cc\u65b9\u5173\u7cfb\u901a\u8fc7**\u4e2d\u65b0\u82cf\u5dde\u5de5\u4e1a\u56ed\u533a**\uff08\u4e8e **1994 \u5e74** \u542f\u52a8\uff09\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u6df1\u5316\uff1b\u8fd9\u662f\u4e09\u4e2a\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u793a\u8303\u9879\u76ee\u4e2d\u7684\u7b2c\u4e00\u4e2a\u3002**2015 \u5e74**\uff0c\u4e24\u56fd\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u5171\u540c\u7eaa\u5ff5\u5efa\u4ea4 25 \u5468\u5e74\uff0c\u5e76\u53d1\u8868\u8054\u5408\u58f0\u660e\uff0c\u5c06\u5173\u7cfb\u5b9a\u6027\u4e3a\u201c\u4e0e\u65f6\u4ff1\u8fdb\u7684\u5168\u65b9\u4f4d\u5408\u4f5c\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u201d\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4f9d\u636e\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e2d\u56fd\u653f\u7b56\u627f\u8ba4\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u552f\u4e00\u5408\u6cd5\u653f\u5e9c\uff1b\u8fd9\u4e00\u6b63\u5f0f\u7acb\u573a\u4e0e\u4e0b\u6587\u6240\u8ff0\u3001\u957f\u671f\u7ef4\u6301\u7684\u5bf9\u53f0\u975e\u5b98\u65b9\u5173\u7cfb\u5e76\u5b58\u3002\n\n## \u5236\u5ea6\u6846\u67b6\u4e0e\u6c11\u95f4\u5f80\u6765\n\n\u65b0\u4e2d\u5408\u4f5c\u901a\u8fc7\u591a\u5c42\u6b21\u673a\u6784\u800c\u975e\u5355\u4e00\u6761\u7ea6\u6846\u67b6\u8fdb\u884c\u7edf\u7b79\u3002**\u53cc\u8fb9\u5408\u4f5c\u8054\u5408\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\uff08JCBC\uff09**\u7531\u526f\u603b\u7406\u6216\u526f\u603b\u7406\u7ea7\u5b98\u5458\u5171\u540c\u4e3b\u6301\uff0c\u662f\u5e74\u5ea6\u6700\u9ad8\u5c42\u7ea7\u8bba\u575b\uff0c\u901a\u5e38\u5c31\u8d38\u6613\u3001\u53ef\u6301\u7eed\u53d1\u5c55\u3001\u6559\u80b2\u548c\u536b\u751f\u7b49\u9886\u57df\u8fbe\u6210\u6570\u5341\u9879\u8c05\u89e3\u5907\u5fd8\u5f55\u3002**\u7b2c 19\u5c4a JCBC** \u4e8e **2023 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708** \u5728\u5929\u6d25\u4e3e\u884c\uff0c\u53d6\u5f97 **24** \u9879\u5408\u4f5c\u6210\u679c\uff0c\u4e3a\u8fd1\u5e74\u6765\u6700\u591a\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u5305\u62ec\u6700\u65b0\u7684\u81ea\u8d38\u534f\u5b9a\u5347\u7ea7\u548c\u4e92\u514d\u7b7e\u8bc1\u5b89\u6392\uff08[CNA\uff0c2023 \u5e74\u5341\u4e8c\u6708](https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/upgraded-singapore-china-free-trade-agreement-24-signed-annual-top-level-meeting-3972101)\uff09\u3002JCBC \u4ee5\u4e0b\u8bbe\u6709\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u7701\u5e02\u5408\u4f5c\u7684\u884c\u4e1a\u7406\u4e8b\u4f1a\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u56db\u5ddd\u3001\u5c71\u4e1c\u3001\u8fbd\u5b81\u3001\u6d59\u6c5f\u3001\u5929\u6d25\u3001\u5e7f\u4e1c\u3001\u6c5f\u82cf\u548c\u4e0a\u6d77\uff1b\u4e09\u4e2a\u653f\u5e9c\u95f4\u9879\u76ee\u4e5f\u8bbe\u6709\u5de5\u4f5c\u7ec4\u3002\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u8bbe\u6709\u5927\u4f7f\u9986\uff0c\u5e76\u5728\u4e0a\u6d77\u3001\u5e7f\u5dde\u3001\u6210\u90fd\u548c\u53a6\u95e8\u8bbe\u6709\u603b\u9886\u4e8b\u9986\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002\u4eba\u6c11\u884c\u52a8\u515a\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u5171\u4ea7\u515a\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u515a\u9645\u4ea4\u6d41\u4e5f\u4e0e\u653f\u5e9c\u5916\u4ea4\u5e76\u884c\u3002\u6c11\u95f4\u5f80\u6765\u5341\u5206\u5bc6\u5207\uff1a\u81ea 1990 \u5e74\u4ee3\u4e2d\u671f\u4ee5\u6765\uff0c\u5df2\u6709\u8d85\u8fc7 **50,000** \u540d\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b98\u5458\u8d74\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u53c2\u52a0\u8003\u5bdf\u548c\u57f9\u8bad\u9879\u76ee\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 \u5e74\u516b\u6708\u67e5\u9605](https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.sg\/about-mfa\/foreign-policy\/countries-and-regions\/peoples-republic-of-china\/)\uff09\u3002\u81ea **2024 \u5e74\u4e8c\u6708 9 \u65e5** \u8d77\uff0c\u53cc\u65b9\u666e\u901a\u62a4\u7167\u6301\u6709\u4eba\u53ef\u514d\u7b7e\u8fdb\u5165\u5bf9\u65b9\u56fd\u5bb6\uff0c\u505c\u7559\u6700\u591a **30 \u5929**\uff0c\u7528\u4e8e\u5546\u52a1\u3001\u65c5\u6e38\u3001\u63a2\u4eb2\u6216\u79c1\u4eba\u4e8b\u52a1\u2014\u2014\u8be5\u4e92\u60e0\u5b89\u6392\u5728 2023 \u5e74 JCBC \u4f1a\u8bae\u4e0a\u5ba3\u5e03\uff0c\u5e76\u901a\u8fc7\u4ea4\u6362\u5916\u4ea4\u7167\u4f1a\u5b9e\u65bd\uff08[ICA\uff0c2024 \u5e74\u4e00\u6708](https:\/\/www.ica.gov.sg\/news-and-publications\/newsroom\/media-release\/mutual-30-day-visa-exemption-arrangement-between-singapore-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china)\uff09\u3002\n\n## \u8d38\u6613\u3001\u6295\u8d44\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u2014\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u81ea\u7531\u8d38\u6613\u534f\u5b9a\n\n\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u53cc\u65b9\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb\u7684\u652f\u67f1\u3002\u81ea **2013 \u5e74** \u8d77\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e00\u76f4\u662f\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u6700\u5927\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u4f19\u4f34\uff08[MFA\uff0c2026 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\u653e\u884c\u8f66\u8f86\uff08[MINDEF\uff0c2016 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