Singapore–United States Relations

<h1>Singapore–United States Relations</h1> <p>Singapore's relationship with the United States is among the deepest and most institutionally dense in its foreign policy. The United States recognised Singapore's independence on <strong>11 August 1965</strong>; formal diplomatic relations and the American embassy opened on <strong>4 April 1966</strong> (<a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/singapore">US State Department, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Leaders marked the <strong>50th anniversary</strong> of ties in <strong>2016</strong>. Today the partnership spans defence access agreements, the <strong>US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA)</strong> — Washington's first FTA with an Asia-Pacific country and, as of 2024–2025, still its only FTA with an <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean">ASEAN</a> member — dense investment flows in both directions, and expanding cooperation in cybersecurity, critical technologies, civil nuclear energy, and space. Singapore is not a US treaty ally, but it hosts United States naval and air logistics at Singapore facilities, buys advanced American military equipment, and maintains one of the largest permanent foreign military training presences on US soil — all within a wider <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine">foreign policy doctrine</a> of refusing to choose between Washington and Beijing. Milestone tables for recognition, MOUs, and USSFTA dates sit in <a href="/en/knowledge/dataset/sgkb.data.us-relations-anchors">us relations anchors</a>.</p> <h2>Historical foundations and strategic partnership</h2> <p>Singapore–United States relations predate independence. American merchants used Singapore as a transshipment port from the <strong>1830s</strong>, and the United States established a consulate in <strong>1836</strong> (<a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/singapore">US State Department, accessed Aug 2026</a>). After separation from Malaysia in 1965, the new republic sought security and economic partners quickly; Washington's recognition within days of independence signalled early alignment on sovereignty and market openness, even as Singapore maintained formal non-alignment. The relationship deepened through the Vietnam War era — when Singapore provided logistical support to US forces — and accelerated after the British military withdrawal from Singapore in the <strong>1970s</strong> left a security vacuum the United States partly filled through access arrangements rather than permanent bases.</p> <p>Institutional diplomacy now runs through multiple standing forums. The <strong>United States–Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue</strong>, co-chaired at permanent-secretary and assistant-secretary level, reviews political and economic cooperation; the <strong>6th</strong> meeting in <strong>February 2024</strong> welcomed the USSFTA's 20th anniversary and took stock of the <strong>Partnership for Growth and Innovation (PGI)</strong> launched in <strong>October 2021</strong> (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/joint-statement-on-the-6th-united-states-28-feb-2024/">MFA, Feb 2024</a>). Singapore also hosts the annual <strong>Shangri-La Dialogue</strong>, which convenes defence ministers and military chiefs from across the Asia-Pacific and has become a flagship venue for US regional engagement. High-profile US visits underscore the relationship's political weight: the US President attended the <strong>US–DPRK summit</strong> in Singapore in <strong>June 2018</strong>; the Prime Minister and the US President signed the Protocol of Amendment renewing the defence facilities MOU in <strong>September 2019</strong> (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/united-states/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>; see <a href="/en/knowledge/dataset/sgkb.data.officeholders">officeholders</a>). The Foreign Minister has described the partnership as nurtured across both Democratic and Republican administrations over <strong>60 years</strong>, with fundamentals that outlast individual leaders (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>).</p> <h2>Defence cooperation and US regional presence</h2> <p>The defence relationship is the partnership's most visible pillar — and the one most often cited when observers describe Singapore as an undeclared US security partner, even though Singapore is <strong>not</strong> a treaty ally like Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines. The <strong>1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore</strong>, signed by the founding Prime Minister and the then US Vice President, allows US forces access to Singapore's air and naval bases and provides logistics support for transiting personnel, aircraft, and vessels (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_nr/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). Under its ambit, the United States has rotationally deployed fighter aircraft for exercises, refuelling, and maintenance; <strong>Littoral Combat Ships</strong> since <strong>2013</strong>; and <strong>P-8 Poseidon</strong> maritime patrol aircraft since <strong>2015</strong> (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). Singapore frames this access as support for a US strategic presence that remains vital to regional peace and stability (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_nr/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). The <strong>2019 Protocol of Amendment</strong>, signed by the Prime Minister and the US President, extended the 1990 MOU for another <strong>15 years</strong> (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>).</p> <p>Above the facilities MOU sits a layered agreement architecture. The <strong>2005 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security</strong> uniquely recognised Singapore as a <strong>Major Security Cooperation Partner</strong> of the United States (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). The <strong>2005 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA)</strong> consolidated military-to-military, policy, and technology cooperation; the <strong>2015 Enhanced DCA</strong> added humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cyber defence, biosecurity, and strategic communications (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). The <strong>Strategic Security Policy Dialogue (SSPD)</strong>, established under the 2005 agreements, sets the bilateral defence agenda; at the <strong>13th SSPD</strong> in <strong>September 2023</strong>, both sides discussed US support for SAF overseas training and technology access — including the Republic of Singapore Air Force's <strong>F-35</strong> acquisition — alongside cybersecurity and critical technologies (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/18sep23_nr/">MINDEF, Sep 2023</a>). In <strong>May 2024</strong>, MINDEF and the US Department of Defense signed a <strong>Defence Innovation Cooperation MOU</strong> at the Shangri-La Dialogue, prioritising maritime security and counter-uncrewed aircraft systems (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/31may24_fs2/">MINDEF, May 2024</a>).</p> <p>Cooperation runs in both directions. The Singapore Armed Forces maintains <strong>three permanent training detachments</strong> in Idaho, Arizona, and Texas — comprising the <strong>second-largest</strong> permanent foreign military contingent stationed in the United States (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). RSAF personnel train at Luke Air Force Base under <strong>Peace Carvin II</strong> and participate in exercises such as <strong>Red Flag</strong> alongside US counterparts; senior Singapore leaders have used detachment visits to underline the depth of training ties (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/07oct23_nr/">MINDEF, Oct 2023</a>). Singapore buys the bulk of its advanced platforms from US suppliers — F-15 and F-16 fighters, Apache helicopters, and F-35 jets — giving Washington leverage over technology transfer that Singapore accepts in exchange for interoperability. Singapore officials consistently argue that US regional engagement underpins the security and economic order from which Southeast Asia benefits, while insisting Singapore never outsources its own defence.</p> <h2>Trade, investment, and the USSFTA</h2> <p>The economic relationship matches the defence partnership in depth. The <strong>US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA)</strong> entered into force on <strong>1 January 2004</strong> after <strong>11 rounds</strong> of negotiations; the then Prime Minister and the then US President signed the agreement in <strong>2003</strong> (<a href="https://www.mti.gov.sg/newsroom/speech-by-minister-gan-kim-yong-at-the-us-singapore-free-trade-agreement-20th-anniversary-business-reception-at-washington-dc/">MTI, 2024</a>; <a href="https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/grow-your-business/go-global/international-agreements/free-trade-agreements/find-an-fta/ussfta">Enterprise Singapore, accessed Aug 2026</a>). It was the United States' <strong>first</strong> FTA with an Asia-Pacific country and, as of <strong>2024–2025</strong>, remains its <strong>only</strong> FTA with an ASEAN member (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The USSFTA eliminates tariffs on Singapore's exports to the United States, waives US merchandise processing fees on qualifying Singapore-origin goods, liberalises services market access, and protects cross-border investment; exporters <strong>self-certify</strong> origin and US importers claim preferential treatment — the same model described in <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.economy-finance.trade-and-fta-network">trade and fta network</a> (<a href="https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/grow-your-business/go-global/international-agreements/free-trade-agreements/find-an-fta/ussfta">Enterprise Singapore, accessed Aug 2026</a>).</p> <p>Bilateral merchandise trade has <strong>almost tripled</strong> since 2004 (<a href="https://www.mti.gov.sg/newsroom/speech-by-minister-gan-kim-yong-at-the-us-singapore-free-trade-agreement-20th-anniversary-business-reception-at-washington-dc/">MTI, 2024</a>). As of <strong>2024–2025</strong>, the United States is Singapore's <strong>largest foreign direct investor</strong> by country, its <strong>top trading partner in services</strong>, and its <strong>second-largest trading partner in goods</strong> (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>; <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/united-states/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Cumulative US FDI stock in Singapore exceeds US investment in China, India, Japan, and South Korea <strong>combined</strong> (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The Singapore Embassy in Washington reports more than <strong>6,600</strong> US companies based in Singapore; bilateral trade and Singapore's investments across more than <strong>45</strong> US states support around <strong>350,000</strong> American jobs (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>; page last updated 16 Apr 2026). Singapore is the <strong>third-largest Asian investor</strong> in the United States, with some <strong>200</strong> Singapore companies operating across dozens of states (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The United States consistently runs a <strong>trade surplus</strong> with Singapore — a fact Singapore cites when arguing it is unlikely to face direct US tariff action despite global trade tensions (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>).</p> <p>Beyond the USSFTA, the <strong>Partnership for Growth and Innovation (PGI)</strong>, launched in <strong>2021</strong> by the Minister for Trade and Industry and the US Commerce Secretary, targets collaboration in the digital economy, advanced manufacturing and supply chains, clean energy, and healthcare (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Singapore participates in the <strong>Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)</strong>, including the Supply Chain Agreement that entered into force in <strong>February 2024</strong> (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/joint-statement-on-the-6th-united-states-28-feb-2024/">MFA, Feb 2024</a>). People-to-people links include the <strong>US–Singapore Summer Exchange Scholarship</strong> (50 students each way over five years from <strong>2016</strong>), mutual trusted-traveller programmes (<strong>Global Entry</strong> for Singapore citizens; <strong>Enhanced Immigration Automated Clearance</strong> for US citizens), and the <strong>Third Country Training Programme</strong> jointly offering capacity building to ASEAN and, since <strong>2023</strong>, Pacific Islands Forum members (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>).</p> <h2>Balancing Washington and Beijing</h2> <p>Singapore's United States relationship sits inside the same omni-directional strategy that governs its <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.china-relations">China ties</a> — the central tension in its <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine">foreign policy doctrine</a>. Singapore hosts US naval logistics and buys American weapons while running government-to-government industrial projects in China and maintaining dense trade and investment links with Beijing. Leaders describe the posture as <strong>&quot;pro-Singapore&quot;</strong> rather than pro-America or pro-China: useful to both powers without being &quot;made use of&quot; by either. The Foreign Minister has said Singapore delivers the <strong>same message</strong> to Washington and Beijing, will remain open to enterprises from both countries, and must engage <strong>all</strong> emerging poles of power — the US, China, India, the EU, and beyond — at a time when the post-1945 liberal order is eroding (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>).</p> <p>US–China strategic mistrust, technology export controls, and tariff disputes have made this balancing act materially harder since the late 2010s. Singapore's leadership argues that full economic decoupling would damage both superpowers and the wider region, and that dense trade agreements — including the USSFTA, CPTPP, and RCEP — offer partial insulation. But the Foreign Minister has also warned that as a small open economy whose trade exceeds <strong>three times</strong> GDP, Singapore will be hit <strong>indirectly</strong> even if it avoids direct US tariffs, because any degradation of global supply chains affects re-exports and regional demand (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). Critics abroad sometimes portray Singapore as a US security proxy; critics at home occasionally worry the facilities MOU exposes Singapore to great-power pressure. Singapore's consistent answer is that US regional presence has underwritten Asia-Pacific stability for decades, that ASEAN elevated ties with Washington to a <strong>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</strong> in <strong>2022</strong>, and that hosting US forces is a sovereign choice distinct from alliance — compatible with deep economic engagement with China. The US relationship is therefore not a rival track to China ties but one compartment of a single strategy of maximising options in an increasingly bifurcated world.</p> <h2>Frontier cooperation: cyber, technology, space, and nuclear energy</h2> <p>Singapore–United States cooperation has expanded beyond traditional defence and trade into <strong>frontier domains</strong> that both governments treat as strategic. <strong>Cybersecurity</strong> cooperation includes the inaugural <strong>US–Singapore Cyber Dialogue</strong> in <strong>2022</strong> and a declaration of intent signed in <strong>2018</strong> for a Singapore–US Cybersecurity Technical Assistance Programme (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>; <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/united-states/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). The <strong>US–Singapore Dialogue on Critical and Emerging Technology</strong>, launched in <strong>2023</strong>, covers artificial intelligence, digital economy and data governance, biotechnology, critical infrastructure, defence innovation, and quantum information science (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). <strong>Space</strong> cooperation followed Singapore's signing of the <strong>Artemis Accords</strong> in <strong>2022</strong> and the first bilateral <strong>Space Dialogue</strong> in <strong>2023</strong> (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>).</p> <p><strong>Climate</strong> cooperation runs through the <strong>US–Singapore Climate Partnership</strong>, first launched in <strong>2021</strong> and updated in <strong>2023</strong> to intensify work on regional energy transition, low-emission technologies, nature-based solutions, urban decarbonisation, and capacity building (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). On <strong>civil nuclear energy</strong>, the two governments signed a <strong>123 Agreement</strong> on <strong>31 July 2024</strong> — the standard US framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation — which entered into force in <strong>December 2024</strong>, alongside a memorandum on strategic civil nuclear cooperation signed in <strong>January 2025</strong> (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20240731--123a-joint-agreement-31-jul-2024/">MFA, Jul 2024</a>; <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The agreements enable Singapore to evaluate advanced nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors, against climate goals while meeting non-proliferation standards — Singapore has not committed to building nuclear plants, but officials treat civil nuclear cooperation as part of the long-term low-carbon options mix. These frontier programmes illustrate how the US partnership functions as a living platform: anchored by the 1990 facilities MOU and the USSFTA, but continuously extended into domains that did not exist when diplomatic relations opened in 1966.</p>

简介

新加坡—美国关系

新加坡与美国的关系是新加坡外交政策中最深厚、制度联系最密集的关系之一。美国于 1965 年八月 11 日承认新加坡独立;双方于 1966 年四月 4 日建立正式外交关系,美国驻新加坡大使馆也于当天开馆(美国国务院,2026 年八月查阅)。两国领导人于 2016 年纪念关系建立 50周年。如今,伙伴关系涵盖防务准入协议、美新自由贸易协定(USSFTA)——华盛顿与亚太国家签署的首个自贸协定,并且截至 2024–2025 年,仍是华盛顿与东盟成员国签署的唯一自贸协定——双向密集的投资往来,以及不断扩大的网络安全、关键技术、民用核能和太空合作。新加坡不是美国条约盟友,但为美国海军和空军在新加坡设施提供后勤支持,采购先进的美国军事装备,并在美国本土维持规模最大的外国常驻军事训练力量之一——这一切都符合更广泛的外交政策原则,即拒绝在华盛顿和北京之间选边站。有关承认、谅解备忘录及 USSFTA 日期的里程碑表格,见美新关系基准数据。

历史基础与战略伙伴关系

新加坡与美国的关系早于新加坡独立。自 1830年代起,美国商人便利用新加坡作为转运港;美国于 1836 年在新加坡设立领事馆(美国国务院,2026 年八月查阅)。新加坡于 1965 年脱离马来西亚后,新成立的共和国迅速寻求安全和经济伙伴;华盛顿在新加坡独立数日内予以承认,表明双方在主权和市场开放方面早期立场一致,尽管新加坡维持正式的不结盟政策。双方关系在越南战争时期深化——当时新加坡为美军提供后勤支持——并在 1970年代英国军队撤出新加坡后加快发展;英国撤军造成的安全真空,部分由美国通过准入安排而非永久基地予以填补。

如今,制度化外交通过多个常设论坛开展。由常任秘书和助理国务卿级官员共同主持的美新战略伙伴关系对话,负责审视政治和经济合作;2024 年二月举行的第 6届会议欢迎 USSFTA 实施 20周年,并检视于 2021 年十月启动的增长与创新伙伴关系(PGI)进展(外交部,2024 年二月)。新加坡也主办一年一度的香格里拉对话会,邀请亚太各地的国防部长和军方首长出席,已成为美国开展区域接触的重要平台。高层美国访问彰显了双边关系的政治分量:美国总统于 2018 年六月赴新加坡出席美朝峰会;总理和美国总统于 2019 年九月签署议定书,修订并延长防务设施谅解备忘录(外交部,2026 年八月查阅;另见在任公职人员)。外交部长表示,过去 60 年来,无论民主党还是共和党执政,双方都持续培育这一伙伴关系,其根基超越个别领导人的任期(外交部,2025 年二月)。

防务合作与美国的区域存在

防务关系是这一伙伴关系中最显著的支柱,也是观察人士形容新加坡为美国非正式安全伙伴时最常提及的一环,尽管新加坡并非日本、韩国或菲律宾那样的条约盟友。**1990 年《有关美国使用新加坡设施的谅解备忘录》**由新加坡开国总理和时任美国副总统签署,允许美军使用新加坡的空军和海军基地,并为过境人员、飞机和船只提供后勤支持(国防部,2019 年九月)。根据该备忘录,美国自 2013 年起轮调部署濒海战斗舰,自 2015 年起轮调部署 P-8 Poseidon 海上巡逻机;此外,还轮调部署战斗机用于演习、空中加油和维修(国防部,2019 年九月)。新加坡将此类准入安排视为对美国战略存在的支持,并认为这一存在对区域和平与稳定仍至关重要(国防部,2019 年九月)。总理和美国总统签署的 2019 年修订议定书,将 1990 年谅解备忘录延长了 15 年(国防部,2019 年九月)。

设施谅解备忘录之上还有一套多层次的协议架构。2005 年《加强防务与安全合作伙伴关系的战略框架协议》将新加坡认定为美国的主要安全合作伙伴,这一地位独一无二(国防部,2019 年九月)。**2005 年《防务合作协议》(DCA)**整合了军方对军方、政策及技术合作;2015 年《加强版防务合作协议》则新增人道主义援助与救灾、网络防御、生物安全和战略沟通等领域(国防部,2019 年九月)。根据 2005 年协议设立的战略安全政策对话(SSPD)负责制定双边防务议程;在 2023 年九月举行的第 13届 SSPD上,双方讨论了美国对新加坡武装部队海外训练和技术准入的支持——包括新加坡共和国空军采购 F-35 战机——以及网络安全和关键技术(国防部,2023 年九月)。2024 年五月,国防部与美国国防部在香格里拉对话会上签署了防务创新合作谅解备忘录,优先合作领域包括海上安全和反无人机系统(国防部,2024 年五月)。

合作是双向的。新加坡武装部队在爱达荷州、亚利桑那州和得克萨斯州设有 三个常驻训练分遣队,组成驻扎在美国的外国常驻军事力量中规模第二大的队伍(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅)。新加坡共和国空军人员在卢克空军基地参加 Peace Carvin II 训练,并与美国同行参加 Red Flag 等演习;新加坡高级领导人曾到访分遣队,以彰显双方训练联系的深度(国防部,2023 年十月)。新加坡先进军机的主要来源是美国供应商,包括 F-15 和 F-16 战斗机、阿帕奇直升机和 F-35 战机;新加坡接受华盛顿在技术转让方面的影响力,以换取互操作性。新加坡官员一贯认为,美国参与区域事务为东南亚受益的安全和经济秩序提供了支撑,同时坚持新加坡绝不会把自身防务外包。

贸易、投资与 USSFTA

经济关系的深度与防务伙伴关系相当。经过 11 轮谈判后,美新自由贸易协定(USSFTA)于 2004 年一月 1 日生效;时任总理和时任美国总统于 2003 年签署该协定(贸工部,2024 年;新加坡企业发展局,2026 年八月查阅)。这是美国与亚太国家签署的首个自贸协定,截至 2024–2025 年,仍是美国与东盟成员国签署的唯一自贸协定(外交部,2025 年二月)。USSFTA取消新加坡出口至美国商品的关税,对符合条件的新加坡原产商品免收美国商品处理费,开放服务市场准入,并保障跨境投资;出口商自行认证原产地,美国进口商则申请优惠待遇——这与贸易与自贸协定网络中所述模式相同(新加坡企业发展局,2026 年八月查阅)。

自 2004 年以来,双边商品贸易额几乎增长了两倍(贸工部,2024 年)。截至 2024–2025 年,美国是新加坡按国家计算的最大外国直接投资来源地、服务贸易首要伙伴,也是商品贸易第二大伙伴(外交部,2025 年二月;外交部,2026 年八月查阅)。美国在新加坡的累计直接投资存量超过其在中国、印度、日本和韩国投资的总和(外交部,2025 年二月)。新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆称,超过 6,600 家美国公司在新加坡设立据点;双边贸易以及新加坡在美国 45 个以上州的投资,支持约 350,000 个美国就业岗位(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅;该网页最后更新于 2026 年四月 16 日)。新加坡是美国的第三大亚洲投资者,约有 200 家新加坡公司在美国数十个州经营(外交部,2025 年二月)。美国对新加坡一直保持贸易顺差——新加坡以此说明,尽管全球贸易局势紧张,自己不太可能直接遭到美国关税措施影响(外交部,2025 年二月)。

除 USSFTA 外,由贸工部长和美国商务部长于 2021 年启动的增长与创新伙伴关系(PGI),着眼于数字经济、先进制造与供应链、清洁能源和医疗保健领域的合作(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅)。新加坡参与印太经济繁荣框架(IPEF),包括于 2024 年二月生效的《供应链协议》(外交部,2024 年二月)。民间交流包括美新暑期交流奖学金(自 2016 年起,五年内双方各有 50 名学生参与)、互惠的可信旅客计划(新加坡公民可使用 Global Entry;美国公民可使用加强版移民自动通关系统),以及双方共同开展的第三国培训计划,为东盟成员提供能力建设,并自 2023 年起扩展至太平洋岛国论坛成员(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅)。

在华盛顿与北京之间保持平衡

新加坡与美国的关系,处于管理其对华关系的同一套全方位战略之中——这是其外交政策原则的核心张力。新加坡为美国海军提供后勤支持并采购美国武器,同时在中国开展政府间产业项目,并与北京维持密切的贸易和投资联系。领导人将这一立场称为**“亲新加坡”,而非亲美或亲中:与两大强国合作,但不被任何一方“利用”。外交部长表示,新加坡向华盛顿和北京传达相同的信息**,将继续向两国企业开放,并必须与所有新兴力量中心接触——包括美国、中国、印度、欧盟及其他力量;这一切都发生在 1945 年后自由主义秩序逐渐瓦解之际(外交部,2025 年二月)。

自 2010年代后期以来,美中战略互疑、技术出口管制和关税争端使这种平衡更加困难。新加坡领导层认为,全面经济脱钩会损害两个超级大国和更广泛的区域,而包括 USSFTA、《跨太平洋伙伴全面进步协定》(CPTPP)和《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》(RCEP)在内的密集贸易协定,能提供一定程度的缓冲。不过,外交部长也警告,新加坡是一个贸易额超过 GDP 三倍的小型开放经济体,即使避免美国直接加征关税,也会受到间接冲击,因为全球供应链一旦受损,就会影响转口贸易和区域需求(外交部,2025 年二月)。海外批评者有时将新加坡描绘成美国的安全代理;国内批评者偶尔担心,设施谅解备忘录会使新加坡暴露于大国压力之下。新加坡的一贯回应是,美国在区域的存在数十年来一直支撑着亚太稳定;东盟于 2022 年将与华盛顿的关系提升为全面战略伙伴关系;新加坡接纳美军是主权选择,不等同于结盟,并且与对华深入经济交往相容。因此,美新关系不是与对华关系相竞争的另一条路线,而是新加坡在日益分化的世界中争取最大选择空间这一整体战略中的一个部分。

前沿领域合作:网络、技术、太空与核能

新加坡与美国的合作已超越传统防务和贸易,扩展至两国政府都视为战略领域的前沿领域。网络安全合作包括 2022 年举行的首届美新网络对话,以及双方于 2018 年签署的关于新加坡—美国网络安全技术援助计划的意向声明(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅;外交部,2026 年八月查阅)。美新关键与新兴技术对话于 2023 年启动,涵盖人工智能、数字经济与数据治理、生物技术、关键基础设施、防务创新和量子信息科学(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅)。新加坡于 2022 年签署《阿耳忒弥斯协定》,随后双方于 2023 年举行首届双边太空对话,开启太空合作(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅)。

气候合作通过美新气候伙伴关系开展,该伙伴关系于 2021 年启动,并于 2023 年更新,以加强区域能源转型、低排放技术、基于自然的解决方案、城市脱碳和能力建设等方面的工作(新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆,2026 年八月查阅)。在民用核能方面,两国政府于 2024 年七月 31 日签署了**《123 协定》**——这是美国和平利用核能合作的标准框架——该协定于 2024 年十二月生效;双方还于 2025 年一月签署了关于民用核能战略合作的谅解备忘录(外交部,2024 年七月;外交部,2025 年二月)。这些协议使新加坡能够根据气候目标评估包括小型模块化反应堆在内的先进核技术,同时遵守防扩散标准——新加坡尚未承诺兴建核电厂,但官员将民用核能合作视为长期低碳能源选项组合的一部分。这些前沿计划表明,美新伙伴关系是一个不断发展的平台:以 1990 年设施谅解备忘录和 USSFTA 为根基,同时持续扩展至 1966 年双方建立外交关系时尚不存在的领域。